Smith v. Sam Carbis Solutions Group, LLC
4:16-cv-02320
D.S.C.Nov 15, 2016Background
- Plaintiff Cynthia Smith worked for Defendant Sam Carbis Solutions Group from 2008 until termination June 30, 2015; she was a Benefits Coordinator who took medical leave May 19, 2015 after an alleged emotional breakdown.
- Smith alleges repeated verbal abuse, harassment and intimidation by COO Shawn Mizell and HR representative Leslie Antici and that management did not remediate despite complaints.
- Smith filed a workers’ compensation claim June 11, 2015 and was terminated June 30, 2015, purportedly for restructuring; she alleges termination was retaliation for taking FMLA leave and filing the workers’ compensation claim.
- Claims pleaded: FMLA retaliation (survives at this stage), and state-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
- Defendant moved to dismiss IIED and wrongful discharge under Rule 12(b)(6). The magistrate judge recommends granting the motion as to both state-law claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether IIED is barred by South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act exclusivity | Smith contends the alleged torts were intentional and committed by officers/alter egos (COO, HR rep), bringing her IIED claim outside exclusivity | Defendant argues IIED based on workplace harassment is preempted by the Act and no alter-ego facts are pled | Court: IIED claim is largely preempted; allegations insufficient to show Antici is alter ego, but plausible COO could be an alter ego — preemption supports dismissal |
| Whether IIED pleadings state an actionable IIED claim (extreme/outrageous conduct; severe distress) | Smith alleges severe emotional distress from constant harassment and emotional breakdown | Defendant argues allegations (verbal abuse, harassment, intimidation) are conclusory and fall short of extreme/outrageous conduct required | Court: Allegations are insufficient as a matter of law to show conduct "extreme and outrageous" or severe distress; IIED dismissed |
| Whether wrongful discharge claim may proceed despite an available statutory remedy (FMLA) | Smith says wrongful discharge is pled in the alternative if FMLA claim fails | Defendant says public-policy tort is unavailable when a statutory remedy exists for the same injury | Court: Because FMLA provides a remedy for alleged retaliatory termination during leave, wrongful-discharge claim based on that theory is barred and dismissed |
| Whether termination for complaining of harassment states a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy | Smith argues dismissal is premature and discovery may reveal a novel public-policy basis | Defendant says Smith fails to identify any clear mandate of public policy deriving from law | Court: Plaintiff identifies no statute, constitutional source, or binding precedent establishing a clear public policy; South Carolina courts narrowly construe the exception — wrongful discharge claim dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standard requires plausible factual content)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading must state a plausible claim)
- Dickert v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 311 S.C. 218 (1993) (employee IIED claims barred by Workers’ Compensation Act except for alter-ego/intentional employer acts)
- Loges v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 308 S.C. 134 (1992) (IIED precluded by exclusivity provision)
- Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219 (1985) (public-policy wrongful discharge exception narrowly applied)
- Taghivand v. Rite Aid Corp., 411 S.C. 240 (2015) (reiterating restraint in expanding public-policy exception)