2:20-cv-00900
E.D. Pa.Jan 25, 2021Background:
- Smith alleged continuous sexual harassment by co-worker Jose Rosario from spring 2017 until his termination in June 2018, including graphic sexual comments, an attempted groping, offers of money for sex, and work-related retaliation (sabotage of inspection tasks).
- Smith filed suit on February 18, 2020 asserting PHRA/PFPO claims, IIED, assault and battery, and declaratory relief; she later consented to dismiss all claims against Rosario except IIED and declaratory relief.
- Rosario moved to dismiss arguing the IIED claim was time-barred and, alternatively, failed to state a claim; the court previously entered and then set aside a default against Rosario.
- The principal legal questions were when an IIED claim based on a course of sexual harassment accrues under Pennsylvania law and whether the pleaded facts meet the demanding "extreme and outrageous" standard for IIED.
- The court held Smith’s IIED claim accrued when Rosario’s harassment ceased (June 2018), making the February 2020 filing timely, and found the amended complaint pleaded sufficient facts to survive a 12(b)(6) challenge on IIED grounds.
- The court struck Smith’s request for declaratory relief because the underlying discrimination/battery claims were time-barred and declaratory relief is prospective, not a vehicle for adjudicating past wrongs.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Accrual / statute of limitations for IIED | Smith argued the harassment was a continuing violation and the entire course should be considered (accrual at end of harassment). | Rosario argued only events within two years before filing are relevant (post-Feb 18, 2018). | Court held accrual occurred when harassment ceased (June 2018); IIED timely filed Feb 18, 2020. |
| Sufficiency of IIED pleading (extreme/outrageous, intent, severe distress) | Smith alleged repeated graphic sexual comments, an attempted groping, offers of money for sex, and retaliatory sabotage—sufficient to state IIED. | Rosario argued the conduct did not cross the high extreme/outrageous threshold and single incidents are insufficient. | Court found allegations sufficient to survive dismissal; reasonable jurors could find conduct extreme and outrageous; medical proof required at trial for severe distress. |
| Availability of declaratory relief | Smith sought declaratory relief tied to assault/battery, retaliation, discrimination. | Rosario argued underlying claims are time-barred and declaratory relief is prospective only. | Court struck declaratory relief for past wrongs; unavailable for time-barred claims and not appropriate to redress only past conduct. |
Key Cases Cited
- Kazatsky v. King David Memorial Park, Inc., 515 Pa. 183 (Pa. 1987) (discussed Restatement §46 and held facts insufficient for IIED)
- Hoy v. Angelone, 554 Pa. 134 (Pa. 1998) (explains that sexual harassment generally does not meet IIED but blatantly abhorrent conduct may)
- Fine v. Checcio, 582 Pa. 253 (Pa. 2005) (accrual rule: cause of action accrues when plaintiff could have first maintained action to a successful conclusion)
- Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (U.S. 2007) (federal statement that accrual occurs when plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action)
- Philadelphia Pizza Team, Inc. v. (Pa. Super. Ct.), 209 A.3d 380 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019) (duration and continuity of conduct relevant to IIED outrageousness)
- A McD. v. Rosen, 621 A.2d 128 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (accrual at termination of abusive relationship)
- Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989) (discussion of accrual where contact ceased years before filing)