Smith v. Pavan
2017 Ark. 284
| Ark. | 2017Background
- Appellees (same-sex spouses and parents) challenged Arkansas birth-certificate statutes after Obergefell, arguing the statutes treated similarly situated same-sex couples differently from opposite-sex couples.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed this court, and remanded in light of Obergefell in Pavan v. Smith.
- The Arkansas statutes at issue included Ark. Code Ann. §§ 20-18-401(e),(f) and 20-18-406(a)(2) and also § 9-10-201 (assisted-reproduction presumption).
- The State conceded some constitutional problems and argued for interpretive or limited remedies (e.g., gender-neutral readings of the assisted-reproduction statute).
- The Arkansas Supreme Court majority held the birth-certificate law must be addressed to afford same-sex spouses the same right as opposite-sex spouses to be listed on a child’s birth certificate, but refused to rewrite the statutes itself and remanded for relief consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s mandate.
- A concurrence urged the circuit court to hold evidentiary hearings and make factual findings about how similarly situated couples are treated; a dissent would have declared the specific statutory provisions unconstitutional and stricken them without remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Arkansas birth-certificate law violates Equal Protection by treating same-sex spouses differently | Pavan/parents: statutes deny same-sex spouses the same right to be listed as parents, violating Obergefell and Equal Protection | State: disputes scope; suggests administrative policy changes or gender-neutral statutory interpretation could cure defects | Court: Law is unconstitutional as applied; must ensure same-sex spouses receive same birth-certificate rights per Pavan; remand for appropriate declaratory/injunctive relief. |
| Whether a gender-neutral reading of the assisted-reproduction statute (§ 9-10-201(a)) cures the constitutional problem | Plaintiffs: statutory scheme must be applied to treat same-sex spouses as similarly situated; remedy should grant same benefit | State: proposed a gender-neutral reading of § 9-10-201(a) to avoid striking statutes | Court: Rejects that the gender-neutral reading alone resolves the constitutional issue; birth-certificate statute itself must be addressed and relief tailored without judicially rewriting statutes. |
| Proper remedial scope — should court rewrite statutes or defer to legislature | Plaintiffs: seek effective relief to secure equal treatment | State: urges courts not to legislate and to defer to legislature or use narrow interpretations | Court: Courts cannot rewrite statutes (separation of powers); must extend statutory benefits to same-sex spouses by declaratory/injunctive relief but leave substantive redrafting to legislature. |
| Whether to vacate and strike the challenged statutory provisions or remand for further proceedings | Plaintiffs: want relief enforcing equal treatment | State: concedes some provisions unconstitutional; argues remedy should be limited | Majority: Reverses and remands for judgment consistent with U.S. Supreme Court; refuses to strike statutes outright. Dissent: would strike §§ 9-10-201(a) and 20-18-401(f)(1) as unconstitutional and void. |
Key Cases Cited
- Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (same-sex couples have fundamental right to marry; marriage-based legal benefits must be equally available)
- Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (per curiam) (applying Obergefell, state birth-certificate laws that treat same-sex couples differently are unconstitutional)
- City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (Equal Protection principle: similarly situated persons must be treated alike)
- Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1994) (analysis required for levels of scrutiny in equal-protection challenges)
- McLaughlin v. Jones in & for Cty. of Pima, 401 P.3d 492 (Ariz. 2017) (state court extended marital-paternity presumption to similarly situated female spouses rather than nullifying statute)
