Smith v. JEFFERSON COUNTY BD. OF SCHOOL
2011 WL 475186
| 6th Cir. | 2011Background
- Board abolished the Jefferson County Alternative School and outsourced services to Kingswood to reduce costs.
- Kingswood is a private, Christian-oriented day-treatment provider; Kingswood staff were not Board employees or supervised by the county Director of Schools.
- Teachers were terminated; Forgety and Smith were tenured; Kucera was non-tenured; all sought redress under §1983 and state laws.
- District court granted summary judgment for Board on standing and other claims; issue of standing for Establishment Clause raised on appeal.
- Kingswood contract and budget decisions occurred in 2003; Board claimed financial savings justified outsourcing; Board’s actions challenged as Establishment Clause violations.
- Court addresses whether teachers have individual or municipal-taxpayer standing and whether Board members have legislative immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to challenge Establishment Clause | Forgety and Kucera seek municipal-taxpayer standing; Smith lacks standing. | No standing under federal prudential rules;Kingswood expenditure not cognizable. | Forgety and Kucera have municipal-taxpayer standing; Smith does not. |
| Procedural due process | Board failed to provide process before abolishing the program if not legislative. | Budgetary, legislative act; no pre-violation hearing required. | Board's legislative-action satisfied due process; no violation. |
| Substantive due process | Establishment Clause violation could ground substantive due process. | Direct Establishment Clause claim precludes independent substantive due process claim. | Substantive due process claim is affirmed as dismissed; Establishment Clause controls. |
| Legislative immunity of Board members | Board members acted beyond legislative authority; not immune. | Actions were legislative in nature; immune as individuals. | Board members entitled to legislative immunity in individual capacities; qualified immunity not addressed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lynch v. Leis, 382 F.3d 642 (6th Cir. 2004) (standing requires injury in fact, traceability, redressability)
- Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (U.S. 1982) (standing for constitutional challenges and injury recognized)
- Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (U.S. 1923) (municipal-taxpayer standing for misuse of funds)
- Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (U.S. 1952) (state taxpayers lack standing; municipal standing varies by context)
- Koenick v. Felton, 190 F.3d 259 (4th Cir. 1999) (municipal-taxpayer standing for unconstitutional expenditures)
- Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1991) (municipal taxpayer standing; expenditure can be injury)
- DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (U.S. 2006) (limits on standing; parity with municipal-taxpayer doctrine)
- Hawley v. City of Cleveland, 773 F.2d 736 (6th Cir. 1985) (standing where alleged loss or misspending of funds)
- Dillon's Rule, none (principle cited in opinion) (local-government authority defined by statute or implied powers)