Smith v. Erie Ins. Co. (Slip Opinion)
148 Ohio St. 3d 192
| Ohio | 2016Background
- On July 25, 2011 Scott Smith drove off Plasterbed Road after alleging a northbound, dark-colored SUV crossed left of center; there was no physical contact, no other witnesses, and the other vehicle was never identified.
- Smith called 9-1-1; the trooper’s accident report and medical records documented the incident but were based solely on Smith’s statements. Smith submitted his 9-1-1 transcript, the trooper’s report, and medical records to Erie.
- Erie denied the uninsured-motorist (UM) claim; the Smiths sued for a declaratory judgment seeking UM coverage under their Erie policy.
- The policy defined a hit-and-run UM vehicle to require "independent corroborative evidence" that the unidentified driver caused the injury and stated insured testimony alone is not independent corroboration unless supported by additional evidence.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Erie, holding the Smiths failed to present evidence independent of Scott’s testimony; the Sixth District reversed, finding the policy ambiguous and construing it for the insured.
- The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Sixth District, holding that "additional evidence" may include evidence derived from the insured’s statements (e.g., 9-1-1 transcripts, police reports, medical records) and that such evidence can satisfy the policy’s corroboration requirement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether policy requires corroboration independent of insured’s testimony | Smith: policy allows "additional evidence" even if derived from insured (police reports, medical records) to support insured’s testimony | Erie: "additional evidence" must be independent, non-derived third-party evidence; repackaged insured statements insufficient | Held: "additional evidence" may be derived from insured’s statements; policy construed in insured’s favor as ambiguous |
| Proper interpretation of clause: "Testimony of the insured...shall not constitute independent corroborative evidence, unless...supported by additional evidence" | Smith: means insured testimony plus supportive evidence (even if derived from insured) can be independent corroboration | Erie: clause requires objective, independent corroboration distinct from insured’s testimony | Held: Clause allows insured’s testimony to count if supported by additional evidence; broad "support" standard applies |
| Effect of Girgis (physical-contact requirement) on current policy language | Smith: policy language is more generous than Girgis and permits non–third-party supporting evidence | Erie: Girgis requires independent third-party corroboration; statute/policy should retain objective requirement | Held: Girgis supplanted by policy/statutory language; policy here is less restrictive than Girgis and does not require third-party testimony |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate on these facts | Smith: disputed facts and supportive documents (9‑1‑1 transcript, police report, medical records) preclude summary judgment | Erie: documents merely repackaged Smith’s statements and cannot satisfy policy’s independent corroboration | Held: Court reversed summary judgment for insurer; evidence derived from insured may be sufficient to survive summary judgment and go to factfinder |
Key Cases Cited
- Girgis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 75 Ohio St.3d 302 (1996) (rejected physical-contact requirement; established corroborative-evidence test requiring independent third-party testimony)
- King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St.3d 208 (1988) (ambiguous insurance provisions construed against insurer and for insured)
- Granger v. Auto-Owners Ins., 144 Ohio St.3d 57 (2015) (policy interpretation principles: give effect to parties’ intent reflected in plain language)