Smith v. Bishop Gadsden Episcopal Retirement Community
2:16-cv-03113
D.S.C.Oct 31, 2017Background
- Carol Anne Smith, an African American former employee of Bishop Gadsden, was hired in 2013, promoted to concierge, and alleges she was promised a raise and commission that were never paid; she was terminated on January 6, 2016.
- Smith alleges racial discrimination, retaliation (including for reporting pay discrepancies and a workers’ compensation claim), hostile work environment, unpaid wages under state law, and retaliatory discharge; she filed an amended complaint asserting these claims in March 2017.
- Smith filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on April 18, 2016, after completing an EEOC intake questionnaire on April 11, 2016 but before her EEOC charge and district-court complaint were filed.
- In her bankruptcy Schedule A/B, Smith answered "yes" to listing claims against third parties and disclosed "Wrongful termination claim–represented by Wigger Law Firm" and "Worker’s compensation claim–represented by Attorney Alan Tanenbaum." She answered "none" to a follow-up line for "other contingent and unliquidated claims."
- Defendant Gadsden moved for summary judgment, arguing judicial estoppel bars Smith’s employment claims because she failed to fully disclose them to the Bankruptcy Court; Smith contends she did disclose her potential wrongful termination claim.
- The district court denied summary judgment, finding Smith’s bankruptcy disclosures were not clearly inconsistent with her current claims and that judicial estoppel therefore did not apply.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether judicial estoppel bars Smith's suit because she failed to disclose claims in bankruptcy | Smith disclosed wrongful termination and workers’ compensation claims in Schedule A/B and did not intentionally conceal claims against Gadsden | Gadsden argues Smith failed to disclose her EEOC charge and contingent employment claims, thus misled the Bankruptcy Court and should be estopped from litigating them now | Denied — disclosures ("wrongful termination" and "workers’ compensation") put the Bankruptcy Court on notice; no clear, intentional inconsistency shown |
| Whether omission in Schedule A/B #34 ("other contingent claims") indicates concealment | Smith need not repeat claims already disclosed in preceding question; omission not evidence of intent to conceal | Gadsden emphasizes "none" answer under penalty of perjury shows concealment | Denied — court finds #34 followed a prior disclosure; omission not indicative of intentional concealment |
| Whether failure to list the EEOC intake under Statement of Financial Affairs #9 is fatal | Smith had not yet filed an EEOC charge or administrative proceeding when she filed bankruptcy, so #9 did not require listing | Gadsden argues the duty to amend continued and omission shows concealment | Denied — court found no duty-to-amend issue sufficient to show intentional misrepresentation for judicial estoppel |
| Whether this case is controlled by Vanderheyden (where judicial estoppel applied) | Smith distinguishes Vanderheyden because she did disclose wrongful termination and workers' comp claims in bankruptcy | Gadsden relies on Vanderheyden to show nondisclosure warrants estoppel | Denied — court distinguishes Vanderheyden (there the plaintiff made no disclosure); here disclosures were made and not clearly inconsistent |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (context on summary judgment burdens)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (definition of "genuine issue" and summary judgment role)
- New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (judicial estoppel requires clearly inconsistent factual positions)
- Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219 (Fourth Circuit four-factor test for judicial estoppel)
- King v. Herbert J. Thomas Mem’l Hosp., 159 F.3d 192 (intentionality requirement for judicial estoppel)
- Stone v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 188 (summary judgment standards in Fourth Circuit)
- Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105 (judicial estoppel not applied where later pleading merely elaborates prior factual position)