Smith v. Baker, 3:15-cv-00234

Background

In 2007 Smith, a Nevada prisoner, stabbed another inmate at the Clark County Detention Center; video and an admission to officers implicated Smith.
Smith was charged with multiple offenses; he ultimately pled guilty in state district court to one count: battery by a prisoner with intent to promote, further, or assist a criminal gang.
Smith was sentenced to two consecutive 28–72 month terms, to run consecutive to an existing sentence for second-degree murder with a deadly weapon.
Smith filed state post-conviction habeas petitions and a motion to withdraw his guilty plea; Nevada state courts denied relief and affirmed on appeal.
In federal habeas Smith claimed ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC), alleging counsel (and the prosecutor) had led him to believe his new sentence would run concurrent to his existing sentence or had changed plea terms without his knowledge.
The district court reviewed the claim under AEDPA deference and denied federal habeas relief and a certificate of appealability, concluding the state-court denial of IAC was not unreasonable.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether counsel was ineffective for allegedly assuring Smith his sentence would run concurrent to his existing sentence	Smith: counsel (and prosecutor) changed plea terms after agreement and misled him into believing the sentence would be concurrent	Respondents: plea agreement and plea colloquy show no promise of concurrency; change in wording was reflected in signed March 28, 2013 agreement; overwhelming evidence supported plea	Court: Denied — state courts reasonably found no deficient performance or prejudice under Strickland/Hill; plea was knowing and voluntary
Whether Smith was prejudiced such that he would have gone to trial but for counsel's conduct	Smith: would not have pled guilty if he had known sentence would be consecutive	Respondents: overwhelming evidence and Smith’s expressed desire to plead guilty undermine claim he would have insisted on trial	Court: Denied — Smith failed to show a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea and gone to trial (Hill standard)
Whether the state-court adjudication was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedents under AEDPA	Smith: state rulings conflicted with Strickland/Hill when considering the plea change and counsel’s assurances	Respondents: state courts applied Strickland/Hill reasonably; factual findings supported by record	Court: Denied — AEDPA deference applies; state-court decision was not objectively unreasonable
Whether a certificate of appealability (COA) should issue	Smith: issues are debatable and warrant review	Respondents: no substantial showing of debatable constitutional error	Court: Denied — reasonable jurists would not debate correctness of disposition

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (Ineffective assistance two-prong test: deficient performance and prejudice)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (IAC prejudice standard for plea cases—reasonable probability petitioner would have gone to trial)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (double deference where Strickland and AEDPA both apply)
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (definition of "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" under §2254(d))
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (framework for §2254(d) review)
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (clarifying Strickland application in federal habeas)
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings)
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (standard for issuing a certificate of appealability)
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (reinforcing deference in Strickland/AEDPA context)