Smiley, Rodney Elnesto, WR-31,454-03

Applicant Rodney E. Smiley is serving two concurrent sentences: a 1994 25-year theft conviction (pre‑1996 law) and a 2006 10‑year injury‑to‑a‑child conviction (post‑1996 law).
Under TDCJ calculation/promotions, Smiley’s mandatory‑supervision date for the 1994 theft was advanced to May 13, 2013; he became eligible for discretionary mandatory supervision (DMS) on the 2006 conviction in September 2010.
TDCJ and the Board of Pardons and Paroles (BPP) waited more than two years to give Smiley DMS notice for the 2006 conviction and denied DMS votes in 2013–2014; TDCJ treated the 1994 theft as governed by current §508.149 rather than the pre‑1996 Article 42.18 §8(c).
TDCJ’s stated policy: an inmate will not be released to mandatory supervision on any sentence until he is eligible for release on all mandatory‑eligible concurrent sentences (i.e., release is calculated on the “controlling”/holding offense).
Applicant contends (1) the late and constitutionally deficient DMS notices violated due process, and (2) TDCJ’s policy unlawfully applies the post‑1996 discretionary scheme to a pre‑1996 holding conviction, causing ex post facto/retroactivity problems and depriving him of mandatory release on May 13, 2013.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Remedy for late BPP vote/deficient notice of DMS	Smiley: notices were constitutionally deficient because TDCJ delayed DMS proceedings for >2 years and based notices on wrong legal premise; he was denied timely opportunity to be heard and prejudiced	State/TDCJ: BPP ultimately held timely, specific DMS hearings and votes; later proceedings render earlier notice claims moot	No final merits ruling in this brief; Court previously remanded for resolution and invited briefing — matter not finally decided here (remand/invited briefing)
2. Legality of TDCJ policy refusing release on one concurrent sentence until eligible on all	Smiley: his holding (1994) theft conviction is controlled by pre‑1996 Art. 42.18 §8(c), which mandates release when time served + good time = sentence maximum; TDCJ policy contradicts that statute and creates ex post facto/retroactivity violations; he was entitled to mandatory release May 13, 2013	TDCJ: an offender may not be released to mandatory supervision until eligible to be released on all mandatory‑eligible offenses; thus the controlling date should be computed on the controlling offense and DMS timing may be adjusted accordingly	No final merits ruling in this brief; Applicant requests immediate release on the 1994 theft sentence; Court previously remanded and invited briefing — matter remains pending

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (state statutes using mandatory language create a protected liberty interest requiring due process notice and opportunity to be heard)
Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987) (use of mandatory language in parole/mandatory‑release statutes creates a presumption in favor of release when statutory conditions are met)
Ex parte Geiken, 28 S.W.3d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (Texas law recognizes a liberty interest in mandatory supervision and requires timely notice of review)
Ex parte Retzlaff, 135 S.W.3d 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (30‑day advance, specific notice required; vague notice of review is constitutionally deficient)
Ex parte Mabry, 137 S.W.3d 58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (savings provision and choice of law: statute in effect when holding offense committed governs mandatory‑supervision eligibility)
Ex parte Thompson, 173 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (the statute in effect when the holding offense was committed determines eligibility for parole/mandatory supervision)
Ex parte Rutledge, 741 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (retroactive changes to sentence‑related credits can violate ex post facto/retroactivity prohibitions)
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981) (retroactive changes to good‑time credit provisions can implicate ex post facto protections)
LaChance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262 (1998) (due process protections attach where statutory language creates a liberty interest)