Smallwood v. State, 152 A.3d 776

Background

In 1984, 15-year-old Dameron Smallwood fatally stabbed Madge Gibson; he was charged as an adult, denied transfer back to juvenile court after a 1985 reverse-waiver hearing, pleaded not guilty on an agreed statement of facts, was convicted of first‑degree murder, and sentenced to life.
At the 1985 reverse-waiver hearing, psychiatric experts (including Dr. McDaniel) diagnosed serious pathology but testified Smallwood was not legally insane or otherwise unable to be tried; the court denied transfer to juvenile court.
In 2011, Dr. McDaniel—who had evaluated Smallwood in 1985—revised her original opinion, diagnosing severe depression with dissociation and PTSD and opining Smallwood should have been found not criminally responsible (NCR) at the time of the offense.
Smallwood filed a petition under Md. Code, Crim. Proc. §8‑301 (writ of actual innocence), arguing Dr. McDaniel’s revised opinion was newly discovered evidence creating a substantial possibility the 1985 result would differ.
The circuit court denied the petition (finding the statute limited to defendants who did not commit the offense and finding Dr. McDaniel’s revised opinion unreliable); the Court of Special Appeals affirmed; the Court of Appeals granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals affirmed: §8‑301 requires “actual innocence” (did not commit the crime); a later finding of NCR does not establish actual innocence because guilt and criminal responsibility are distinct—a person can be guilty yet not punishable.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Crim. Proc. §8‑301 authorize relief for a petitioner who asserts newly discovered evidence that he should have been found not criminally responsible?	Smallwood: Dr. McDaniel’s revised diagnosis is newly discovered evidence creating a substantial possibility the 1985 result would differ, entitling him to relief under §8‑301.	State: §8‑301 is limited to petitioners who are actually innocent—i.e., did not commit the offense; being NCR does not equal innocence.	Held: §8‑301 applies only to those who are actually innocent (did not commit the crime); a claim of NCR does not satisfy that requirement.
What is the plain meaning of "actual innocence" under §8‑301?	Smallwood: The statute need not require denial of commission; newly discovered mental‑health evidence can warrant relief.	State: "Actual innocence" means factual innocence—absence of commission of the criminal act.	Held: By ordinary meaning and context, "actual innocence" means the petitioner did not commit the underlying crime.
Is a post hoc revised expert opinion (decades later) "newly discovered evidence" that could satisfy §8‑301?	Smallwood: Dr. McDaniel’s changed professional judgment constitutes newly discovered evidence.	State: A late‑revised opinion lacks sufficient reliability; facts did not change and the opinion could have been reached earlier.	Held: Even assuming the opinion were newly discovered, it would not establish actual innocence or warrant relief; the circuit court reasonably discounted the 2011 opinion’s weight.
Does Maryland Rule 4‑332 (requiring petitioner to aver conviction was based on an offense petitioner did not commit) govern this petition?	Smallwood: §8‑301 lacks that requirement; the Rule cannot change substantive statute.	State: Rule 4‑332 reflects and clarifies §8‑301’s scope; Rule is consistent with statute and precedent.	Held: §8‑301 already requires factual innocence; Rule 4‑332 is consistent and does not alter substantive rights.

Key Cases Cited

Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156 (court explains statutory interpretation principles and discusses §8‑301’s purpose)
Yonga v. State, 446 Md. 183 (holding writ of actual innocence unavailable to attack convictions entered on guilty pleas)
Langworthy v. State, 284 Md. 588 (explaining guilt and criminal responsibility are distinct and a defendant can be found guilty but NCR)
Gregg v. State, 409 Md. 698 (discussing §8‑201 and that "actual innocence" means the petitioner did not commit the underlying crime)