Smaia v. MRS BPO, LLC, 1:19-cv-04253

Plaintiffs Eliezer Smaia and Esther Mayer received debt-collection letters from MRS BPO, LLC offering a one-time settlement amount with a deadline; plaintiffs allege the letters failed to state whether payment must be mailed by or received by the deadline.
Plaintiffs sued under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, claiming the ambiguous deadline language was false, deceptive, or misleading.
Defendant moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing lack of Article III standing, that the statements were not false or misleading, and that any ambiguity was not a material FDCPA violation.
The Court denied the standing challenge, finding an alleged §1692e violation suffices as an injury-in-fact, but applied the least-sophisticated-consumer standard and the materiality requirement for §1692e claims.
The Court held the alleged ambiguity—at worst causing a consumer to act a few days earlier—was immaterial and therefore not a viable §1692e claim, and granted dismissal with prejudice.
Case: United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Judge Dora L. Irizarry; decision dated March 31, 2020.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Article III standing	Plaintiffs: an alleged §1692e violation is a concrete injury	MRS: Plaintiffs suffered no concrete, particularized harm	Court: Plaintiffs have standing; alleged §1692e violation suffices as injury-in-fact
Whether the deadline language is false/deceptive under §1692e	Plaintiffs: ambiguous wording could mean mail-by or receive-by, making it misleading	MRS: language is not false, deceptive, or misleading	Court: Plaintiffs identified ambiguity but that alone does not establish a violation unless material
Materiality of the ambiguity	Plaintiffs: ambiguity could induce earlier action or otherwise mislead choice	MRS: any ambiguity would not materially affect consumer decision-making	Court: Ambiguity was immaterial (at worst a false sense of urgency); not actionable under §1692e
Rule 12(b)(6) sufficiency/remedy	Plaintiffs: pleadings meet Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standards	MRS: complaint fails to plead a plausible, material violation	Court: Complaint fails to state a claim; motion to dismiss granted and case dismissed with prejudice

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (establishes pleading plausibility standard)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (applies and clarifies Twombly pleading standard)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing elements)
Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993) (uses least-sophisticated-consumer test; ambiguous letters may deceive)
Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008) (least sophisticated consumer standard and reasonableness constraints)
Cohen v. Rosicki, Rosicki & Assocs., P.C., 897 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2018) (materiality requirement for §1692e; §1692e violation can satisfy injury-in-fact)
Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 1996) (ambiguous collection letters may be deceptive under §1692e)
Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2010) (materiality: deception must frustrate consumer's ability to choose response)
Avila v. Riexinger & Assocs., LLC, 817 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2016) (ambiguity and materiality analyzed under §1692e)