Sloper v. City of Chicago
23 N.E.3d 1208
Ill. App. Ct.2015Background
- Sloper left his 1995 Ford Escort with Calomino at the airport on December 5, 2012; he returned December 10.
- Police stopped Calomino driving Sloper’s vehicle near 4816 S. Leclaire; six bags of suspected heroin were found on Calomino.
- The car was impounded under Chicago Municipal Code § 7-24-225, which imposes a $2,000 penalty (increased to $3,000 within 500 feet of a park or school); Calomino listed as driver and Sloper as owner on the impoundment form.
- Lab testing identified heroin; on December 14, 2012, the ALO found probable cause and imposed a $3,235 judgment (penalty, storage, and tow).
- A full impoundment hearing was scheduled for January 11, 2013; the City sought a continuance due to pending lab results, and Sloper objected to the 30-day limit in Municipal Code § 2-14-132(2).
- Hearing dates were continued to February 8 and then March 15, 2013; on March 15, the ALO found narcotics within 500 feet of a park or school was not established and imposed a $3,320 judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the ALO lose jurisdiction by not completing the hearing within 30 days? | Sloper argues 30-day completion is mandatory and a delay voids the decision. | City contends only scheduling within 30 days is required; continuances allowed for good cause. | Directory, not mandatory; jurisdiction retained. |
| Was the continuance for lab results proper under the ordinance? | Continuance violated 30-day limit and harmed Sloper's rights. | Continuance for lab results is permissible; good cause exists. | ALO did not abuse discretion; continuance proper. |
| Is the $2,000 penalty grossly disproportionate as applied? | Penalty bears no relation to vehicle value and owner innocence; unconstitutional as applied. | Penalty serves deterrence and is fixed; not proportionality-violative. | Not grossly disproportionate; as applied, constitutional. |
| Are the additional storage and tow fees constitutionally problematic? | Fees total exceeds the penalty, infringing due process. | Fees resulted from owner’s decision to delay release; no due process violation. | Fees do not violate the constitution; properly assessed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Towers v. City of Chicago, 173 F.3d 619 (7th Cir. 1999) (upholds deterrence rationale for penalties on vehicle owners)
- Jackson v. City of Chicago, 2012 IL App (1st) 111044 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 2012) (upholds 7-24-225 penalty despite lack of innocent owner exception)
- People v. Schaefer, 154 Ill. 2d 250 (1993) (30-day hearing mandate distinguished; due process concerns discussed)
- In re James W., 2014 IL 114483 (Ill. 2014) (procedural commands may be directory; continuances allowed for good cause)
- Landis v. Marc Realty, L.L.C., 235 Ill. 2d 1 (2009) (read statute to ascertain intent; avoid reading in unwritten limitations)
- People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185 (2009) (presumption of constitutionality of ordinances; burden on challenger)