Sloley v. VanBramer, 945 F.3d 30

Background

On April 1, 2013, Maxmillian Sloley was arrested after a domestic dispute and taken to a New York State police station, handcuffed to a wall and informed he would be charged with harassment and criminal mischief.
Trooper Eric VanBramer brought his drug‑sniffing dog to Sloley’s car; Eric says the dog alerted and he recovered a small amount of crack cocaine from the driver’s seat and field‑tested it positive; Sloley denies any drugs in the car.
Eric returned to the station, told Sloley he had found drugs, and ordered a strip and visual body‑cavity search (Sloley was instructed to expose genitals and buttocks); no drugs were found on Sloley.
Sloley was arraigned (drug charge later dropped), then sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming the visual body‑cavity search violated the Fourth Amendment.
The district court granted summary judgment for the VanBramers, finding reasonable suspicion and qualified immunity; the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal as to Bryan (no awareness/intervention) but vacated dismissal as to Eric, held visual body‑cavity searches require reasonable suspicion, and remanded because disputed facts (whether Eric actually recovered drugs from the car) precluded summary judgment.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether visual body‑cavity searches incident to arrest require individualized reasonable suspicion	Sloley: such searches are highly invasive and require specific, articulable reasonable suspicion.	VanBramers: no Second Circuit or Supreme Court precedent made that rule clearly established for felony arrests.	The Court held visual body‑cavity searches incident to any arrest must be supported by a specific, articulable reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is secreting contraband in the cavity.
Whether Eric had reasonable suspicion to conduct the search of Sloley	Sloley: no indicia supported belief he was secreting contraband; disputed whether any drugs were recovered from the car.	VanBramers: dog alerts, alleged cocaine recovered from driver’s seat, Sloley’s evasive remarks and flight from scene supported suspicion.	There is a genuine factual dispute (notably whether drugs were recovered); summary judgment inappropriate — remand for trial on merits.
Whether Eric is entitled to qualified immunity	Sloley: Hall and persuasive authority made the rule clear; officer not entitled to immunity if no reasonable suspicion.	VanBramers: law unsettled re felonies; reasonable officers could disagree so qualified immunity applies.	Court held the requirement was clearly established (New York Court of Appeals’ Hall plus persuasive authority) for NY troopers at the time; qualified immunity cannot be resolved at summary judgment because of factual disputes.
Whether Bryan is liable for failure to intervene	Sloley: Bryan participated in arrest and should have prevented the search.	VanBramers: no evidence Bryan knew of or had opportunity to stop the visual search.	Court affirmed dismissal of claims against Bryan: no evidence he knew Eric would conduct the visual body‑cavity search or had realistic opportunity to intervene.

Key Cases Cited

People v. Hall, 10 N.Y.3d 303 (N.Y. 2008) (New York Court of Appeals requiring reasonable suspicion for visual body‑cavity searches)
Hartline v. Gallo, 546 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2008) (strip searches require individualized reasonable suspicion)
Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2013) (addressed qualified immunity for visual cavity search pre‑Hall)
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (scope and limits of search‑incident‑to‑arrest doctrine)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (reasonable‑suspicion standard)
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (scope of searches incident to arrest)
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318 (2012) (discussion that felony/misdemeanor distinction is not dispositive for some search rules)
White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (qualified immunity requires that existing precedent place constitutional question beyond debate)