Sloans v. Berry
189 Wash. App. 368
Wash. Ct. App.2015Background
- Lula Mae Hunter’s 1989 will left her residence to niece Lula S. Sloans for life/use and then to Betty Jean Berry, with the property reverting to the residue if unused; Sloans was residuary beneficiary.
- After Hunter’s death, Sloans (a minor) and Berry signed an Agreement in 1991 permitting Berry to occupy the residence under maintenance/tax obligations; Berry possessed the property until her death in 2013.
- Sloans filed two creditor’s claims against Berry’s estate in December 2013 and February 2014 alleging breach of the Agreement; the estate rejected the claims (Jan and Mar 2014).
- Within 30 days of rejection, Sloans filed a “Petition on Rejection of Creditor’s Claims” under TEDRA (chapter 11.96A RCW) in the probate cause, seeking a TEDRA judicial proceeding; she later amended to add the second claim.
- The estate moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, arguing TEDRA is not the proper vehicle for enforcing a rejected creditor’s claim and that the claim must be an ordinary civil action against the personal representative within 30 days. The commissioner dismissed with prejudice and awarded fees.
Issues
| Issue | Sloans’ Argument | Berry Estate’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a suit on a rejected creditor’s claim may be brought as a TEDRA petition | TEDRA supplements Title 11 and broadly permits judicial proceedings on any “matter,” so a claimant may choose TEDRA to resolve creditor claims | RCW 11.40.100 requires a suit on a rejected claim to be an ordinary civil action outside probate; TEDRA cannot supersede that requirement | TEDRA does not permit commencing a creditor’s suit as a TEDRA petition; a claimant is not a TEDRA “party” (creditor) until a civil judgment establishes the claim |
| Whether filing a creditor’s suit as a TEDRA petition requires dismissal (including with prejudice) | Even if misfiled, Sloans filed within 30 days, served the estate, and paid fees — form should not defeat substance; remedy is conversion, not dismissal | Misfiling is fatal; analogous to Estate of Kordon where procedural noncompliance required dismissal | Misfiling was error but not jurisdictional or time-barred; dismissal was improper because suit was filed in superior court within 30 days and estate had notice and opportunity to defend |
| Whether filing under the probate cause number deprived the court of subject-matter or personal jurisdiction | Filing in existing probate was acceptable for TEDRA/was timely; personal jurisdiction existed because estate’s counsel accepted service | Filing under the probate cause number and as TEDRA meant the court lacked subject-matter/personal jurisdiction for an ordinary creditor action | Superior court had authority; procedural form (probate cause number) is not jurisdictional when suit is in superior court and defendant received notice; CR 12(b)(1) dismissal improper |
| Whether attorney fees awarded below should stand and how RCW 11.96A.150 applies on remand | Sloans: fees discretionary; novel statutory questions relevant but not dispositive to fee award | Estate: entitled to fees under RCW 11.96A.150 because the proceeding was under TEDRA | Fee award reversed with dismissal; on remand court retains broad equitable discretion under RCW 11.96A.150 to award fees considering relevant factors |
Key Cases Cited
- Schluneger v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank, 48 Wn.2d 188 (1956) (suit on rejected creditor’s claim must be an ordinary civil action, not part of probate)
- McWhorter v. Bush, 7 Wn. App. 831 (1972) (misfiling creditor’s suit in probate is harmless if suit is in superior court within 30 days and defendant had notice)
- In re Estate of Kordon, 157 Wn.2d 206 (2006) (TEDRA cannot supersede statutory procedural requirements that confer jurisdiction or notice obligations)
- Bailey v. Schramm, 38 Wn.2d 719 (1951) (claim becomes a creditor claim only after judgment establishing amount)
- Dougherty v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 150 Wn.2d 310 (2003) (procedural requirements should not be elevated to jurisdictional mandates)
- Atchison v. Great W. Malting Co., 161 Wn.2d 372 (2007) (CR 12(b)(6) can be appropriate when statute-of-limitations bars claim)