Sliney v. Previte, 473 Mass. 283

Background

Sliney alleged repeated sexual abuse by her uncle Previte from 1968–1977 and filed a civil tort action in Superior Court on January 30, 2012; the complaint also named several men she alleged she had been forced to engage with.
A Superior Court judge granted Previte’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in June 2012, dismissing Sliney’s claims as time-barred under the then-applicable three-year statute of limitations in G. L. c. 260, § 4C; the Appeals Court affirmed by rule 1:28.
While Sliney’s petitions for rehearing and for further appellate review were pending, the Legislature (St. 2014, c. 145) enlarged § 4C’s limitations period to 35 years, added a 7-year discovery rule, included an explicit retroactivity clause (§ 8), and declared the act an emergency effective June 26, 2014.
Sliney invoked the 2014 amendments after enactment; Previte argued the amendments could not apply because the prior dismissal was correct when entered and the judgment was final.
The Supreme Judicial Court assumed the pleading facts true, held the statutory retroactivity language clearly applied to pending cases, concluded the judgment was not final while review was pending, and ruled the retroactive extension was constitutional as applied; it vacated the Superior Court dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, leaving the validity of the 1991 release for the trial court to decide.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 2014 amendments to § 4C apply to Sliney’s case	Sliney: § 8's clear retroactivity makes the enlarged limitations period apply to actions filed or pending regardless of accrual date	Previte: Statute applies only to cases that have not passed the procedural point to which the amendment pertains; this case had a correct dismissal and is final	Court: § 8 unambiguously makes the amendment retroactive and it applies to cases pending on effective date; Sliney’s appeal was pending, so judgment was not final
Whether a judgment already entered/affirmed precludes retroactive application	Sliney: Pending appellate review means judgment not final	Previte: Superior Court dismissal (and Appeals Court affirmance) made judgment final and immune from later statutory change	Court: Judgment is final only after all appeals/time to appeal expire; because review was pending June 26, 2014, judgment was not final and statute applies
Whether retroactive application violates due process / vested-rights principles	Sliney: Legislature may extend limitations to redress child-abuse victims; defendants have only procedural interests	Previte: Retroactivity impairs his vested interest in the dismissal and denies fair defense due to stale evidence	Court: Defendant’s interest in limitations is procedural, not a vested substantive right; balancing public interest in protecting child-victims against defendant’s interest shows retroactivity is reasonable and constitutional as applied
Whether the 1991 release bars Sliney’s claims after reinstatement	Sliney: Release invalid (alleged coercion, mental incapacity)	Previte: Release extinguishes claims	Held: Trial court must decide; factual issues exist and were not adjudicated on the pleadings, so remand for further proceedings

Key Cases Cited

Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526 (2002) (motion for judgment on the pleadings treated as motion to dismiss; pleadings assumed true)
Keene Corp. v. Boston, 406 Mass. 301 (1989) (statutory alteration of limitation periods is procedural/remedial and generally can be retroactive)
Vinciullo v. City Council of Waltham, 364 Mass. 624 (1974) (statutes relating to remedies and procedure are commonly applied to pending causes; point-of-proceeding rule explained)
Fontaine v. Ebtec Corp., 415 Mass. 309 (1993) (statutes regulating practice, procedure, and evidence typically operate retroactively)
Smith v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 462 Mass. 370 (2012) (plain statutory language controls legislative intent on retroactivity)
Nunez v. Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 460 Mass. 511 (2011) (statutory interpretation presumes prospective operation absent clear retroactive intent)
Anderson v. BNY Mellon, N.A., 463 Mass. 299 (2012) (presumption in favor of constitutionality; factors for testing retroactive statutes)
Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885) (statute-of-limitations defenses are procedural; revival of remedies not per se a vested-rights violation)