Skyhook Wireless, Inc. v. Google Inc.
12 N.E.3d 440
Mass. App. Ct.2014Background
- Skyhook Wireless developed XPS, a location service that combines GPS, cell-tower, and Wi‑Fi data; Google provides competing Network Location Provider (NLP) as part of Google Mobile Services (GMS) bundled on Android devices.
- Motorola and Samsung entered contracts with Google to ship Android devices preloaded with GMS Apps and to meet Google’s Android Compatibility Definition Document (CDD) and testing requirements; those contracts required Google’s written approval for device distribution.
- Motorola (Sept. 2009) and Samsung (May/Dec. 2009 amendment) separately contracted with Skyhook to preload XPS on some Android devices; Skyhook’s XPS reported hybrid (satellite + network) data via the GPS Provider API and sought to block Google’s collection of network location data.
- Google objected, asserting XPS’s use of the GPS Provider API to report non‑satellite data violated the documented API behavior in the SDK/CDD and would “contaminate” Google’s location database; Google also insisted GMS Apps remain fully functional, including data collection.
- Google directed Motorola and Samsung not to ship devices with the original XPS implementation; Motorola later terminated its Skyhook agreement, and Samsung declined to use XPS citing cost and Google Locator adequacy.
- Skyhook sued under theories of intentional interference with contract and advantageous relations and violation of G. L. c. 93A; the trial judge granted Google summary judgment, and the Appeals Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Google intentionally interfered with Skyhook’s contract with Motorola (and relationships with Motorola/Samsung) by improper motive | Google’s stated technical/data‑integrity reasons were pretext; real motive was to exclude Skyhook from Android market | Google lawfully asserted contractual compatibility and app‑function rights; acted to protect its product/database, not to unlawfully harm Skyhook | No improper motive; contractual assertions were legitimate — interference not wrongful as a matter of law |
| Whether Google used improper means (e.g., threats, misrepresentation) to induce breach | Google misinterpreted/over‑enforced contracts to pressure manufacturers to drop Skyhook | Google had express contractual rights to enforce CDD/API behavior and require accurate reproduction of GMS Apps; its actions were assertion of legal rights, not improper means | No improper means: exercising contractual rights is lawful; no evidence of threats or misrepresentation |
| Whether Skyhook’s G. L. c. 93A claim applies (primarily and substantially in MA) | Skyhook is based in Massachusetts; lost royalties and harm to its business in MA satisfy §11 territoriality | Google’s conduct and communications occurred outside MA (California, Illinois, South Korea); situs of conduct and loss are largely foreign/international | c.93A does not apply as a matter of law; Massachusetts was not the primary and substantial locus of the challenged conduct |
Key Cases Cited
- Drakopoulos v. U.S. Bank Natl. Assn., 465 Mass. 775 (2013) (standard for reviewing facts on summary judgment)
- Go‑Best Assets Ltd. v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 463 Mass. 50 (2012) (de novo review of summary judgment)
- Juliano v. Simpson, 461 Mass. 527 (2012) (summary judgment principles)
- Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706 (1991) (summary judgment review standard)
- United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, 406 Mass. 811 (1990) (elements of intentional interference with contract)
- Blackstone v. Cashman, 448 Mass. 255 (2007) (elements of interference with advantageous relations)
- Pembroke Country Club, Inc. v. Regency Sav. Bank, F.S.B., 62 Mass. App. Ct. 34 (2004) (economic self‑interest as not necessarily improper motive in interference claims)
- Kuwaiti Danish Computer Co. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 438 Mass. 459 (2003) (G. L. c. 93A §11 — "primarily and substantially" territorial test)
- Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2001) (application of §11 when conduct and deception occurred outside MA)
