Skinner v. Patel
4:16-cv-01700
D.S.C.Jul 29, 2016Background
- Plaintiffs (seven current/former employees of two Raceway convenience stores) allege that co-owner Dezendra/Dev Patel sexually assaulted and battered them while they worked at Atkinson 164 and Atkinson 165.
- Plaintiffs assert state-law claims: assault, battery, false imprisonment, and outrage; they also allege that co-owner Darshak “Danny” Brahmbhatt knew of Patel’s conduct and facilitated it, and that Racetrac provided the premises.
- Defendants (Brahmbhatt, Atkinson 165 LLC, Atkinson 164 LLC) removed the case to federal court asserting federal-question jurisdiction under Title VII (hostile work environment/sexual harassment) and sought supplemental jurisdiction over state claims.
- Plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing they pleaded only state-law claims and did not invoke Title VII; they also challenged whether defendants meet Title VII’s employer-size threshold (not dispositive here).
- The magistrate judge evaluated removability under the well-pleaded complaint rule and removal doctrines that require strict construction in favor of remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the complaint raises a federal question sufficient for removal | Complaint pleads only state-law torts (assault, battery, false imprisonment, outrage); no Title VII claim alleged | Underlying facts describe a hostile work environment/sexual harassment that fall within Title VII, so removal is proper and plaintiffs are trying to evade exhaustion requirements | Court held no federal question on the face of the complaint; remand required |
| Whether plaintiff’s ability to have pleaded Title VII precludes remand | Plaintiff may plead only state claims and avoid federal jurisdiction | Plaintiff’s potential to have pleaded Title VII makes removal appropriate to enforce Title VII exhaustion | Court held ability to plead Title VII is irrelevant under the well-pleaded complaint rule; plaintiff controls claims |
| Whether resolution of state torts requires resolution of substantial federal law questions | State torts are independent and do not require addressing federal law | Defendants argued employment-context claims implicate federal law and exhaustion | Court held state claims do not necessarily depend on federal law; no substantial federal question presented |
| Whether defendants’ employer status under Title VII affects removability | Plaintiffs argued defendants lack requisite number of employees (so not Title VII employers) | Defendants produced payroll records asserting they meet the threshold | Court found employer-size issue irrelevant to whether plaintiffs alleged a Title VII claim on the face of the complaint |
Key Cases Cited
- Lehigh Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 337 (discussion of limited jurisdiction of federal courts)
- Strawn v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 530 F.3d 293 (burden on removing party to prove removal proper)
- Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chemicals, Inc., 29 F.3d 148 (when jurisdiction is in doubt, remand is appropriate)
- Able v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 829 F.2d 1330 (removal statutes construed narrowly)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (well-pleaded complaint rule; plaintiff is master of the complaint)
- Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (federal-question jurisdiction standards)
- Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (limits on creating federal jurisdiction when plaintiff pleads state-law claims)