Six Flags Over Georgia II, Lp v. Joshua L. Martin
335 Ga. App. 350
Ga. Ct. App.2015Background
- Joshua Martin was attacked and severely injured by a group of gang members at a Cobb County Transit (CCT) bus stop about 200 feet from Six Flags Over Georgia after leaving and briefly returning toward the park to wait for a bus.
- Prior incidents and gang activity in and around Six Flags were documented: altercations inside the park had previously "spilled over" outside; Six Flags knew of gang presence among employees and patrons; closing time and nearby bus stops/parking lots were identified as "hot spots."
- On the day of the attack, the same group had threatened two families inside the park; reports were made to Six Flags security but the group remained in the park and later attacked Martin at the bus stop.
- Martin sued Six Flags under OCGA § 51-3-1 (premises liability) claiming Six Flags extended its "approaches" to the bus stop (via signage, barricades, invitations to use transit, and security/maintenance activity) and thus owed a duty to keep that area safe; jury returned a $35,000,000 verdict allocating 92% fault to Six Flags.
- Six Flags appealed, arguing (1) the bus stop was not an approach as a matter of law; (2) the criminal attack was not a foreseeable proximate cause; and (3) the trial court erred by refusing to include several nonparty attackers on the verdict form for apportionment.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed that sufficient evidence supported liability and foreseeability but reversed the verdict and remanded for a new trial because the trial court wrongly refused Six Flags’ request to list certain nonparty assailants on the verdict form (apportionment error). Martin’s cross-appeal was dismissed as moot due to remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the CCT bus stop was an "approach" under OCGA § 51-3-1 | Martin: Six Flags invited patrons to use the bus stop and took positive actions (signs, barricades, maintenance, directing traffic, security presence) that effectively extended its approaches to the bus stop | Six Flags: The bus stop was public, noncontiguous property (200 ft away); Six Flags had no right or exclusive control to provide security there, so it was not an approach as a matter of law | Court: Fact question; evidence permitted jury to find Six Flags extended its approach by positive actions and appropriated the bus stop for its benefit — jury verdict on liability can stand (but see remand for apportionment) |
| Foreseeability / proximate cause of third-party criminal attack | Martin: Prior incidents, gang presence among employees, threats made inside park on same day, and known "hot spot" at closing made gang violence at the bus stop reasonably foreseeable | Six Flags: The attack was an unexpected, random criminal act; prior incidents weren’t substantially similar; causation theories speculative without expert evidence | Court: Jury question; evidence of prior gang activity, spillover incidents, same-group threats earlier that day supported foreseeability and proximate causation |
| Whether defendant can apportion fault to nonparty assailants on verdict form (OCGA § 51-12-33) | Six Flags: Trial court should have included additional known and unknown assailants (e.g., Cowart, Forbes, "Mr. Black") for jurors to apportion fault | Martin: Some apportionment arguments not preserved; apportionment to nonparties unnecessary or inadequately proven | Court: Six Flags preserved apportionment as to certain nonparties; trial court misapplied law by excluding nonconvicted/non-testifying contributors — error required reversal and remand for new trial |
| Remedy on appeal: remand scope — liability and damages or damages only | Martin: Trial court errors (jury instructions, effective judgment date) raised but retrial would waste resources; suggested limited remand | Six Flags: Sought reversal and judgment as matter of law (or new trial) | Court: Because apportionment error deprived jury of considering fault of nonparties, reversal and full retrial ordered; concurrence argued remand might be limited to damages but majority ordered new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Motel Props., Inc. v. Miller, 263 Ga. 484 (Ga. 1993) (defines “approaches” and recognizes exception when owner extends approach by positive action)
- Todd v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 258 Ga. 194 (Ga. 1988) (approaches and duty involve factual and legal elements; duty limited by owner’s right in approach)
- Combs v. Atlanta Auto Auction, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 9 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (noncontiguous public ways can be approaches when used primarily by invitees and appropriated by owner)
- Sturbridge Partners, Ltd. v. Walker, 267 Ga. 785 (Ga. 1997) (criminal-act foreseeability requires substantial similarity to prior incidents; foreseeability generally a jury question)
- Couch v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 291 Ga. 359 (Ga. 2012) (OCGA § 51-12-33 apportionment statute—trier must consider fault of all who contributed to injury, including nonparties)
- Double View Ventures, LLC v. Polite, 326 Ga. App. 555 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (trial court’s refusal to allow jury to consider apportionment to a nonparty required reversal; apportionment errors justify new trial)