Sivak v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing
2010 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 620
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | 2010Background
- Sivak was DUI-arrested Feb. 10, 2008, and pled guilty Feb. 5, 2009 to driving after imbibing (ungraded misdemeanor).
- Sentencing included 72 hours to six months in jail, a $1,000 fine, and PennDOT requirements with a $35 monthly supervision fee.
- DL-21 form originally indicated imprisonment but not under 3804(a)(1); an amended DL-21 later reflected 3804(a)(1).
- DOT issued a one-year operating-privilege suspension effective Aug. 23, 2009 based on the Feb. 5, 2009 conviction for DUI (General Impairment).
- Sivak challenged the suspension in a de novo proceeding; the trial court ruled the suspension should be rescinded because Sivak was sentenced under 3804(a)(1) as a first-time offender and not subject to 3804(e)’s suspension.
- DOT appealed, arguing jail sentence removes eligibility for an exception and that plea agreement cannot bind DOT to civil-suspension outcomes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Sivak qualifies for the 3804(e)(2)(iii) exception | Sivak argues he was sentenced under 3804(a)(1) and the plea created an exception to 3804(e). | DOT contends jail time means no 3804(a)(1) exemption; DL-21 and record control reality. | Yes; Sivak falls within the 3804(a)(1) general-impairment penalties and 3804(e)(2)(iii) exemption, so no suspension. |
| Whether the DL-21 form controls the suspension | Clerk's amendment corrected the form; the initial error reflected the plea-under-3804(a)(1) scenario. | DOT may rely on the initial filing and the Clerk’s error to sustain the suspension. | The amended DL-21 correctly reflected 3804(a)(1); the initial error does not sustain the suspension. |
| Whether the plea agreement could bind DOT to civil suspension terms | Trial court could consider the criminal plea to determine the offense; plea cannot bind civil suspension. | PLEA terms cannot bind DOT to revoke or create suspensions in civil proceedings. | Plea agreement cannot bind DOT to civil penalties, but the criminal record clarifies the offense for purposes of 3804(a)(1) analysis. |
| Whether the trial court erred in relying on the plea to sustain Sivak’s appeal | The court found no automatic jail-to-suspension rule and relied on Glidden for interpretation. | PennDOT’s interpretation that jail triggers suspension is inconsistent with the statute and case law. | affirmed; decision consistent with Glidden and statutory structure; there is no automatic jail-to-suspension rule. |
Key Cases Cited
- Glidden v. Dep’t of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 962 A.2d 9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (analyzed whether prison time alone establishes non-eligibility for 3804(a)(1) exemption; first-time/offender penalty scheme governs whether 3804(a)(1) applies)
- Lefever v. Dep’t of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 533 A.2d 501 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) (plea in criminal case cannot bind DOT to withdraw civil license suspension; civil penalties are independent)
- Zawacki v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 745 A.2d 701 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (DOT bears initial prima facie burden; licensee must show clear and convincing evidence to rebut)
- Mateskovich v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 755 A.2d 100 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (clear and convincing standard to rebut DOT’s prima facie case)