56 F.4th 400
6th Cir.2022Background
- Plaintiffs (Sisters for Life, individual sidewalk counselors, Kentucky Right to Life) engage in "sidewalk counseling" to persuade women entering EMW Women’s Surgical Center in Louisville not to have abortions.
- Louisville-Jefferson County ordinance §132.09 prohibits obstructing entry to healthcare facilities and separately bars non-exempt persons from entering or remaining in a painted 10-foot buffer zone at any healthcare facility entrance during business hours.
- The ordinance exempts facility entrants/leavers, people passing to other destinations, municipal agents, and facility employees/agents; plaintiffs allege selective enforcement (e.g., escorts are not treated as violators).
- Plaintiffs sued asserting First Amendment violations and sought a preliminary injunction; the district court denied relief.
- The Sixth Circuit found the buffer-zone provision likely unconstitutional under McCullen v. Coakley because it is not narrowly tailored: it applies to all healthcare facilities though problems are concentrated at EMW and the County failed to seriously pursue less-restrictive alternatives (existing obstruction law, targeted injunctions, use of clinic video, patrols, or federal FOCA-type measures).
- The court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of §132.09(B)(2) and remanded, noting evidence of potential viewpoint-discriminatory enforcement but deciding narrow-tailoring failure sufficed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the buffer-zone ordinance is content-based | County enforces it to silence pro-life sidewalk counseling; evidence shows unequal enforcement (escorts exempt) | Ordinance is content-neutral time/place regulation covering all medical facilities | Court did not definitively rule content-based; noted evidence of selective enforcement but decided result on narrow tailoring grounds |
| Whether a content-neutral 10-foot fixed buffer zone is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest | Ordinance burdens close, personal conversations and literature distribution and is broader than necessary; County failed to use less-intrusive means | Buffer zone is small and facilitates unimpeded access and public safety across healthcare facilities | Not narrowly tailored: applies to all healthcare facilities despite record showing problems mainly at EMW and County failed to seriously use less-intrusive tools (obstruction statute, video evidence, targeted injunctions, patrols) |
| Whether plaintiffs merit preliminary injunctive relief | Enforcement would cause irreparable First Amendment harm; equities/public interest favor injunction | Ordinance promotes safety and access; injunction would hamper those interests | Preliminary injunction appropriate: irreparable harm shown; equities and public interest do not overcome First Amendment violation |
Key Cases Cited
- McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014) (invalidated fixed buffer-zone outside abortion clinics for failing narrow-tailoring requirement)
- Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (time, place, manner restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve significant government interest)
- United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (content-based restrictions trigger strict scrutiny)
- Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (unequal enforcement can render a regulation content- or viewpoint-based)
- Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (upheld a floating "bubble" restriction in the context of unwanted communication at healthcare facilities)
- Am. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021) (narrow-tailoring inquiry focuses on whether a law burdens substantially more speech than necessary)
- Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (preliminary injunction standards)
- Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (loss of First Amendment rights constitutes irreparable harm)
- Hoye v. City of Oakland, 653 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2011) (selective enforcement of speech restrictions can be unconstitutional)
- Reynolds v. Middleton, 779 F.3d 222 (4th Cir. 2015) (invalidating overbroad restrictions in clinic-access context)
