Sissel v. United States Department of Health & Human Services
799 F.3d 1035
D.C. Cir.2015Background
- Sissel challenged the Affordable Care Act (ACA), arguing the individual mandate (26 U.S.C. § 5000A) violated the Origination Clause because it was a "Bill for raising Revenue" that did not originate in the House.
- A three-judge panel held the Origination Clause does not reach the ACA’s shared-responsibility payment because the primary purpose of that provision was regulatory (to expand insurance coverage), not to raise general Treasury revenue.
- Appellant petitioned for rehearing en banc; the full court denied rehearing. Three judges (Rogers, Pillard, Wilkins) concurred in denial; Judge Kavanaugh (joined by three others) dissented from the denial.
- The concurrence relied on Supreme Court precedent adopting a purposive test (Munoz-Flores, Nebeker, Millard) — focus on whether raising general revenue was the primary purpose.
- The dissent argued the ACA plainly raised substantial revenue (projected CBO revenues) and that the Origination Clause should apply to any bill that raises revenue for general governmental purposes; it would grant rehearing en banc to adopt that view but concluded the ACA nevertheless originated in the House because the Senate’s amendment power permits the substitution at issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Sissel) | Defendant's Argument (Gov't / Panel Concurrence) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the Origination Clause apply to the ACA’s shared-responsibility payment (§ 5000A)? | The payment raises substantial revenue and is therefore a "Bill for raising Revenue" requiring House origination. | The payment’s primary purpose is regulatory (to expand health insurance coverage), not to raise revenue for general government; thus it falls outside the Clause. | Held: Purposive test controls; § 5000A is not a bill for raising revenue within the Origination Clause. |
| Proper legal test for Origination Clause scope | Clause text: "All Bills for raising Revenue" means any bill that raises revenue for general purposes should originate in House. | Supreme Court precedent supports a purposive test: bills whose primary purpose is to raise general revenue are covered; program-specific revenue-supporting statutes are not. | Held: Follow Supreme Court precedents (Munoz-Flores, Nebeker, Millard); purposive approach adopted. |
| Is there a textual/germaneness limit on Senate amendments to House-originated revenue bills? | (Sissel) Senate substitution here was not "germane" and therefore exceeded the Clause. | Constitution permits the Senate to "propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills;" Rainey and practice allow broad Senate amendments (including "gut-and-replace"). | Held (in concurrence and dissent as to remedy): the panel did not need to adopt a new rule; Rainey forecloses a judicial germaneness limitation and the ACA here originated in the House as amended. |
| Whether rehearing en banc should be granted to revisit Origination Clause doctrine | (Sissel/supporting judges) The panel’s purposive approach unduly narrows the Clause and weakens House origination power; en banc review warranted. | (Majority) Supreme Court precedent is controlling and narrow; no basis for en banc to overturn that line. | Held: Petition for rehearing en banc denied; majority adheres to purposive precedent. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) (adopts purposive test: statutes that create a program and raise revenue to support it are not "Bills for raising Revenue")
- Twin City Nat’l Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) (taxes incidental to accomplishing a non-revenue statutory purpose are not revenue bills)
- Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906) (taxes as means to accomplish statutory objectives fall outside Origination Clause)
- Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914) (Senate may amend House-originated revenue bills broadly; courts will not second-guess amendment scope)
- Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911) (discusses amendment germane to subject matter; later cases interpret amendment power broadly)