Sinkler v. Berryhill
317 F. Supp. 3d 687
W.D.N.Y.2018Background
- Plaintiff Lakisha Janey Sinkler sought $16,851 in attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and filed a motion on July 6, 2017.
- The Commissioner did not oppose the merits but contested the timeliness of the § 406(b) fee motion.
- On April 11, 2018 the court denied the fee motion as untimely, adopting the view that Rule 54(d)(2)'s 14-day filing period governs § 406(b) petitions, subject to equitable tolling until counsel receives the Commissioner’s notice of award.
- The court explicitly rejected the Tenth Circuit’s McGraw approach (timeliness judged by a general "reasonable time") and followed the Third Circuit’s Walker approach (Rule 54(d) plus equitable tolling).
- Plaintiff moved under Rule 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment, arguing the court should have applied McGraw and that the court improperly promulgated a rule under 28 U.S.C. § 2071; the court denied reconsideration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Governing timeliness rule for § 406(b) fee motions | McGraw: timeliness measured by a reasonable-period standard (Rule 60 principles) | Rule 54(d)(2)'s 14-day deadline applies; courts must still review timeliness | Rule 54(d)(2) governs; equitable tolling applies until counsel gets notice of award (Walker approach) |
| Equitable tolling/detail when clock starts | Plaintiff argues Rule 54(d) is inflexible; seeks broad discretion to expand deadline | Commissioner notes duties as trustee and timeliness objection | Court permits equitable tolling to avoid absurdity but requires party to seek extension if needed; no extension requested here |
| Whether court improperly issued a new rule under 28 U.S.C. § 2071 | Court purportedly created a rule without notice/comment | Court's decision is judicial interpretation, not local-rule promulgation | Court ruled it exercised Article III adjudicatory authority, not rulemaking under § 2071 |
| Weight of other district decisions that granted late § 406(b) fees | Reliance on many district grants where timeliness not discussed; urges flexible approach | Those decisions are nonbinding and courts retain affirmative duty to review timeliness | Court not persuaded; other decisions without timeliness analysis do not control outcome |
Key Cases Cited
- Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002) (district court must determine reasonableness of § 406(b) fees)
- Munafo v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 381 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2004) (standard for Rule 59(e) reconsideration)
- Walker v. Astrue, 593 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2010) (Rule 54(d) applies to § 406(b) with equitable tolling until counsel receives notice of award)
- McGraw v. Barnhart, 450 F.3d 493 (10th Cir. 2006) (timeliness assessed under a flexible reasonable-period standard)
- Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016) (federal courts’ role to interpret and declare the law)