Sinkler v. Berryhill, 305 F. Supp. 3d 448

Plaintiff filed suit seeking review of a denial of Supplemental Security Income; the district court reversed and remanded. Counsel obtained an EAJA fee award of $6,500 by stipulation.
On remand the ALJ granted benefits; the Commissioner issued a notice awarding $67,404 in past-due benefits.
Plaintiff's counsel moved for § 406(b) fees seeking $16,851 (25% cap) and pledged to refund the EAJA award if granted.
The Commissioner did not oppose the amount but noted counsel received the notice of award in late December 2016 and filed the § 406(b) motion over six months later, raising timeliness issues.
The court analyzed whether Rule 54(d)(2)(B) (with equitable tolling per Walker) or Rule 60(b)(6)/reasonableness (per McGraw) governs timeliness, and considered case law and policy implications.
The court held Rule 54(d)(2)(B) applies with equitable tolling until counsel is notified of the notice of award; because counsel filed more than 14 days after notification and offered no justification, the § 406(b) motion was untimely and denied.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Which Federal Rule governs timeliness of a § 406(b) fee motion?	Motion should be judged by a "reasonable time" standard (Rule 60/broad equitable standard).	Rule 54(d)(2)(B) governs timing; if applied literally, equitable tolling may be needed.	Rule 54(d)(2)(B) governs; apply equitable tolling (per Walker) until counsel is notified of the notice of award.
Was counsel's § 406(b) motion timely when filed ~6 months after notice of award?	The filing was acceptable; amount reasonable and Commissioner did not oppose.	Commissioner flagged the 6+ month delay and questioned timeliness.	Untimely: counsel filed well beyond the 14-day tolling window after notice and offered no justification; motion denied.
If McGraw/reasonableness applied, would the delay still be excused?	(Implied) 6 months can be reasonable in some circumstances.	(Implied) Delay must be justified; long unexplained delays are not reasonable.	Even under McGraw's reasonableness test, the unexplained six-month delay was not reasonable; motion denied.
Duty of court vs. Commissioner when Commissioner does not object to timeliness	Court should accept non-opposition.	Commissioner has trustee-like role but often declines to raise timeliness; non-opposition does not bind court.	Court must independently evaluate timeliness and reasonableness even if the Commissioner does not object.

Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (court must independently review reasonableness of contingent-fee § 406(b) agreements)
Wells v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1990) (factors for § 406(b) reasonableness inquiry)
Walker v. Astrue, 593 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2010) (apply Rule 54 with equitable tolling until notice of award is issued/received)
Pierce v. Barnhart, 440 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 2006) (Rule 54 applies; district courts may allow refiling outside 14-day window)
McGraw v. Barnhart, 450 F.3d 493 (10th Cir. 2006) (advocates reasonableness standard and Rule 60(b)(6) approach)