Singleton v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 3d 807

Movant Keith Singleton, a federal inmate at FCI Beckley, filed a timely § 2255 to vacate, with government opposition and movant’s reply.
Indictment (Dec 20, 2009) charged conspiracy to commit wire fraud (count 1), multiple wire fraud counts (counts 18–33), and two money laundering counts (counts 34–35) tied to Citigroup scheme involving an employee, Carin Seals.
Trial (Aug 30–Sep 3, 2010) included admission of 404(b) evidence about a separate “Big Homey Scheme”; movant testified, claiming he believed the funds were a loan.
Jury found movant guilty on all counts (Sept 3, 2010); sentence imposed (Mar 22, 2011) with concurrent terms and substantial restitution; Third Circuit affirmed on direct appeal (Jan 20, 2012).
Movant’s § 2255 claims alleged five ineffective-assistance violations (testifying under compulsion, prejudicial evidence, failure to request a limiting instruction, Santos-based challenge to money laundering, and improper criminal-history calculation).
Court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, addressing each claim and concluding none established Strickland prejudice; motion for certificate of appealability denied.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Coercion to testify and advice to testify	Singleton argues trial counsel forced testimony; advised him about perjury and sentencing impacts.	Singleton claims counsel overrode his wish not to testify and failed to advise about consequences.	Movant not coerced; no prejudice; testimony advice not constitutionally ineffective.
Admission of Big Homey evidence	Morgan’s Big Homey testimony was unfairly prejudicial; counsel should have objected or moved for mistrial.	Court allowed 404(b) Big Homey evidence with limiting instructions; objection/smoothed impact.	No reasonable probability of a different outcome; claim meritless.
Need for contemporaneous limiting instruction	Counsel should have requested a contemporaneous limiting instruction with Morgan’s testimony.	Timing of limiting instruction not rigid; current instruction sufficed.	No prejudice; instruction at close of evidence adequate.
Santos-based challenge to money laundering	Santos forecloses money laundering charges as merger with proceeds of fraud.	No merger problem; evidence supports separate money laundering convictions.	Santos not meritorious here; no ineffective assistance.
Criminal-history calculation	Prior sentences miscalculated; should have used criminal history category I.	Calculation correct under § 4A1.1(a) given ten-year-plus gap; category II proper.	Calculation proper; claim meritless.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (establishes two-prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (U.S. 1987) (right to testify is a defense-right; not compelled testimony)
Brown v. Artuz, Not available in text (Not available) (discusses deficiencies in counsel’s failure to inform defendant of rights (cited in opinion))
Palmer v. Hendricks, Not available in text (Not available) (two-pronged Strickland analysis in choosing to testify)
Sexton v. French, Not available in text (Not available) (discusses right to testify and counsel's role)
Carter v. Lee, 283 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 2002) (defense counsel may strongly advise testifying)
United States v. Pennycooke, 65 F.3d 9 (3d Cir. 1995) (timing of limiting instructions; not mandatory to be contemporaneous)
Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (U.S. 2000) (jury follows court's instructions presumptively)
Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301 (U.S. 1961) (defense testimony importance in trial)
United States v. Walker, 772 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1985) (defense testimony as key defense evidence)