Singletary v. Singletary
431 S.W.3d 234
| Ark. | 2013Background
- Divorce decree (Apr 2010) provided "joint custody" with Appellant (Amy Bishop) as primary physical custodian; settlement agreement contemplated alternating weekly custody and equal division of expenses and time.
- Bishop remarried and sought to relocate to Texas with her new husband in 2011; she moved and filed for a change of custody and child support, arguing relocation was a material change in circumstances.
- Joseph Singletary (Appellee) counterclaimed for sole custody; parties mediated and agreed on a detailed parenting/visitation plan contingent on who received custody.
- At trial both parents and the ad litem testified the parties had effectively shared equal time (a true 50/50 joint-custody arrangement) prior to the move; extended family for the child was located in Arkansas.
- The circuit court found the parties had joint custody, that Bishop's relocation and the parties' inability to cooperate were a material change, and that awarding sole custody to Singletary was in the child’s best interest; it declined to apply the Hollandsworth relocation presumption.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Bishop) | Defendant's Argument (Singletary) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Hollandsworth presumption (that custodial parent’s relocation alone is not a material change) apply? | Bishop: As primary physical custodian, she is entitled to Hollandsworth presumption; relocation alone is not a material change. | Singletary: Parties had joint custody; Hollandsworth applies only to sole/primary-custody situations and therefore does not apply. | Hollandsworth applies only where a parent has been granted sole/primary custody; it does not apply to true joint-custody arrangements. |
| How should relocation in a joint-custody context be analyzed? | Bishop: Hollandsworth should govern (relocation presumption). | Singletary: Lewellyn’s change-of-custody framework governs joint-custody relocation cases (material change + best interest). | Lewellyn controls: in joint-custody cases apply the two-step test—(1) material change since decree, and (2) change in custody is in child’s best interest. |
| Did the parties have true joint custody despite language naming a primary custodian? | Bishop: Labeling her "primary physical custodian" requires Hollandsworth analysis. | Singletary: The decree and parties’ conduct created a true joint-custody (50/50) arrangement; designation of "primary" did not alter joint custody. | Court found ambiguity in decree but resolved it by contract interpretation and evidence of parties’ intent and conduct: the parties had a bona fide joint-custody (50/50) arrangement. |
| Did the circuit court articulate adequate findings and correctly change custody? | Bishop: Court failed to articulate standard and findings; requested Hollandsworth analysis. | Singletary: Court applied Lewellyn, made findings of material change and best interest, and explained considerations (family ties, ad litem recommendation). | Court adequately articulated applying Lewellyn, found material change (move + inability to cooperate) and best-interest factors, and affirmed change of custody to Singletary. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 353 Ark. 470, 109 S.W.3d 653 (Ark. 2003) (announces presumption in favor of relocation for custodial parents with primary custody)
- Lewellyn v. Lewellyn, 351 Ark. 346, 93 S.W.3d 681 (Ark. 2002) (two-step test for change of custody: material change since decree and best interest analysis)
- Blivin v. Weber, 354 Ark. 483, 126 S.W.3d 351 (Ark. 2003) (applied Hollandsworth factors post-decision; discusses interplay of joint/legal custody and primary physical custody)
- Lloyd v. Butts, 343 Ark. 620, 37 S.W.3d 603 (Ark. 2001) (supports requirement to show material change for custody modification)
- Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coughlin, 369 Ark. 365, 255 S.W.3d 424 (Ark. 2007) (rules governing contract interpretation used to resolve custody-decree ambiguity)