Singh v. McHugh
109 F. Supp. 3d 72
D.D.C.2015Background
- Iknoor Singh, an observant Sikh student at Hofstra, sought to enroll in Army ROTC without cutting his hair or beard and while wearing a turban; the Army denied his request for a religious accommodation.
- Singh previously audited ROTC classes but could not enroll because the Army required agreement to its grooming and uniform rules; after litigation began the Army processed and formally denied his accommodation.
- The denial relied on military concerns: unit cohesion, morale, good order and discipline, individual and unit readiness, and health/safety (esp. protective mask fit).
- The Army has routinely granted many exceptions to grooming/uniform rules (e.g., >100,000 medical "shaving profiles," tattoo grandfathering and waivers) and has previously accommodated some Sikh servicemembers.
- Singh sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA); the court consolidated preliminary-injunction and merits, and considered cross-motions for summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Justiciability of relief to enroll in ROTC | Singh seeks only enrollment in ROTC (not guaranteed enlistment or commission); court can order equal access to compete for contract | Army contended ordering "enlistment" or commissioning is nonjusticiable military decision | Court: moot any enlistment argument; Singh seeks ROTC enrollment and relief is justiciable |
| Whether the denial substantially burdens religious exercise under RFRA | Denial of accommodation to enroll forces Singh to choose between religious practice and government benefit (ROTC enrollment) | Initially argued Singh was civilian so not burdened; later conceded denial is government action and enrollment is a benefit | Court: defendants conceded burden; denial constitutes a substantial burden under RFRA |
| Applicability of RFRA strict scrutiny vs. military deference | Singh: RFRA applies and requires strict, individualized scrutiny of compelling interest and least-restrictive means; Holt v. Hobbs limits unquestioning deference | Army: military judgments deserve substantial deference; uniformity and training needs justify denial | Court: RFRA's strict scrutiny applies; while military expertise is respected, the Army cannot prevail on mere say-so and must meet RFRA's demanding showing |
| Whether denial furthers a compelling interest by least-restrictive means | Singh: Army already grants many exceptions and previously accommodated Sikhs; temporary/revocable accommodations or specialized masks are less restrictive alternatives | Army: denying accommodation is necessary to preserve cohesion, discipline, readiness, and safety; future operational needs justify a categorical denial in ROTC | Court: Army failed to show, as applied to Singh, that denial furthers compelling interests by least-restrictive means; numerous existing exceptions and prior Sikh accommodations show less-restrictive alternatives (e.g., temporary accommodation) are available; judgment for Singh |
Key Cases Cited
- Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015) (RLUIPA/RFRA requires courts to demand concrete, individualized proof from officials and forbids unquestioning deference to institutional assertions)
- Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (RFRA enforces Sherbert/Yoder compelling-interest/least-restrictive-means test)
- Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (RFRA requires application of compelling-interest test to the particular claimant)
- Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (established compelling-interest test for burdens on religious exercise)
- Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (application of compelling-interest test in religious-exercise context)
- Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (laws cannot survive strict scrutiny when they permit comparable exemptions)
- Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953) (courts must respect military judgments in many contexts)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard; legal conclusions not accepted as true)