Sindi v. El-Moslimany
896 F.3d 1
| 1st Cir. | 2018Background
- In 2010 Samia and Ann El-Moslimany published extensive accusations about Dr. Hayat Sindi (a limited-purpose public figure) across blogs, emails, social media, and to scientific and donor communities, alleging fraud in her PhD, misrepresenting her age to win awards, and overstating her role in Diagnostics for All.
- Dr. Sindi sued in Massachusetts state court for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), tortious interference with contract, and tortious interference with advantageous relations; the case was removed to federal court on diversity grounds and tried to a jury in 2016.
- The jury returned general verdicts finding Samia liable for IIED, defamation, and tortious interference with contract and advantageous relations; it found Ann liable for defamation and the two interference claims; total jury awards were in the millions and later partially remitted by the district court.
- The district court also entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from republishing six categories of statements about Sindi (e.g., that she is an academic/scientific fraud; that she fraudulently received her PhD; that she lied about her age to get awards).
- On appeal the First Circuit independently reviewed the First Amendment–sensitive defamation findings and damages, affirmed liability on defamation, IIED, and interference with contract (with remittiturs), reversed tortious interference with advantageous relations, and vacated the permanent injunction as an unconstitutional prior restraint.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether jury verdicts for defamation and actual malice were supported by clear and convincing evidence | Sindi argued the record (fabrications, failure to investigate, motive, corroborating testimony of reputational harm) established falsity and actual malice as to key statements | Defendants contended many chalk-listed statements were nonactionable opinion/hyperbole and that the general verdict failed to identify which statements formed the basis of liability | Affirmed: independent First Amendment review upheld defamation verdicts as supported by clear-and-convincing evidence for core categories (PhD fraud, age misrepresentation, DFA role); general verdict not reversible as plain error given trial focus on those statements |
| Whether damages for defamation and IIED were excessive | Sindi maintained reputational and noneconomic harms plus economic losses justified awards | Defendants argued lack of proof of economic loss and that awards were excessive | Affirmed: damages (as remitted by district court) were not excessive given evidence of reputational harm, emotional distress, and lost i2 Institute earnings; IIED award sustained |
| Whether tortious interference with advantageous relations was proved | Sindi argued defendants disrupted various prospective relationships (beyond i2 Institute) | Defendants said proofs were speculative, lacked specific prospective contracts, and defendants lacked knowledge of such relations | Reversed: evidence of interference with third-party prospective relations (other than i2) was speculative and defendants lacked knowledge; verdict on this count vacated |
| Whether a permanent injunction barring republication of six statements survives First Amendment strict scrutiny | Sindi argued injunction was proper because the six statements were adjudicated defamatory, defendants likely to repeat them, and less intrusive measures were inadequate | Defendants argued injunction is an overbroad prior restraint that chills protected speech, fails to account for context, and lacks narrow tailoring | Vacated: injunction treated as a prior restraint and failed strict scrutiny because it was overbroad, did not accommodate contextual truth or changed circumstances, and risked chilling protected speech; district court erred to the extent it imposed a categorical bar |
Key Cases Cited
- N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public-figure defamation requires proof of actual malice)
- Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (distinguishing public vs private plaintiffs; actual malice standard for public figures)
- Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (requires independent appellate review for First Amendment–sensitive mixed questions)
- Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989) (actual malice may be inferred from deliberate avoidance of the truth and fabrication)
- Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (opinion vs. provable facts in defamation law)
- Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (injunctions affecting speech must be no broader than necessary; context of prophylactic injunctions)
- Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (upholding narrowly tailored injunctions based on prior unlawful conduct; alternative channels of communication factor)
- eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (permanent injunction requires inadequate legal remedies and narrow tailoring)
- Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (strong presumption against prior restraints)
- Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734 (2005) (per curiam) (indicates limits on injunctive remedies for speech; caution in broad ruling)