Sinan Gider v. Lydia Hubbell
M2016-00838-COA-R3-JV
| Tenn. Ct. App. | Apr 27, 2017Background
- Parents entered a 2008 parenting agreement but effectively shared custody equally; disputes about schooling and decision-making arose in 2014–2015.
- Magistrate and juvenile-court orders (July 2014, Jan. 2015, Oct. 2015) enjoined Mother from homeschooling, required the child attend public school, restricted disparaging comments about the child’s schooling and the case in the child’s presence, and forbade certain social-media references to Father.
- Father sought modification of custody and filed a civil-contempt petition alleging 19 social-media posts by Mother violated the court’s injunctions.
- The juvenile court found Mother willfully violated three orders on 19 occasions, ordered removal of posts, set a review hearing, and later awarded Father partial attorney’s fees ($500 at $25/month).
- On appeal, the court reviewed (1) whether the injunctions were lawful prior restraints on speech and (2) whether each contempt count was supported by the record; Mother admitted willful violation but argued the orders were unconstitutional.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gider) | Defendant's Argument (Hubbell) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lawfulness of injunctions as prior restraints on speech | Orders were lawful, within court's power to protect child and parental rights; may support contempt | Orders impermissibly restrained Mother’s First Amendment rights and thus cannot support contempt | Court: Orders were issued by a court with jurisdiction and mostly lawful; some portions were overbroad and modified or reversed |
| Specific contempt counts—did Mother violate the orders alleged | Each cited social-media post disparaged Father or referenced the case and thus violated injunctions | Mother admitted posting but argued some posts did not fall within the precise prohibitions | Court: 17 of 19 counts supported; two counts (Count 4 and Count 11) reversed because they did not violate existing injunctions |
| Sufficiency and clarity of the orders (Konvalinka factors 1–2) | Orders were clear and specific enough to enforce | Some prohibitions (e.g., ban on any social-media posts about child’s behavior or any reference to Father) were overbroad or vague | Court: Some provisions overbroad; modified October 2015 order in prior appeal and held portions of Jan. 2015 order unconstitutional as overbroad |
| Sanctions and requests to sanction Father or his attorney | Sought enforcement and fees for contempt; did not warrant sanctions against counsel | Mother asked court to sanction Father and his attorney for abusive process | Court: Award of partial attorney’s fees for contempt was within discretion; denied Mother’s requests to hold Father or his counsel in contempt or to sanction them |
Key Cases Cited
- Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cty. Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346 (Tenn. 2008) (defines four-element contempt framework and standards of review)
- Doe v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, 104 S.W.3d 465 (Tenn. 2003) (distinguishes civil vs. criminal contempt and proof standard)
- Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515 (Tenn. 2010) (standards for abuse of discretion review)
- Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (U.S. 1974) (defamatory false statements not protected by First Amendment in same way as truthful speech)
- In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439 (Ohio 1990) (juvenile court authority to control extrajudicial comments by litigants)