Simpson v. State, 214 Md. App. 336

William S. Simpson III was indicted for arson-related offenses arising from fires on Nov. 15, 2009; Apr. 4, 2010; and May 16, 2010; after two trials he was convicted of attempted second-degree arson and sentenced to 10 years (all but 2 suspended).
On May 16, 2010 surveillance captured a masked individual dousing Ms. Byers’ car with liquid; the Byers family identified Simpson from the video and by his gait/posture.
Police located Simpson, detected gasoline odor at his home, and a certified accelerant‑detection canine (Joy) alerted on Simpson’s car and shoes; ATF testing later detected gasoline on the shoes.
Simpson gave Miranda warnings, executed a written confession admitting to the three incidents, providing particulars (e.g., lighter, bottle, description of shoes) that matched physical evidence.
On appeal Simpson raised: (1) prosecutorial misconduct in opening when the prosecutor said “he will tell you” he committed the crimes (arguing a Fifth Amendment/Article 22 violation), and (2) erroneous admission of testimony by the canine handler interpreting his dog’s accelerant alerts without expert disclosure.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether prosecutor’s opening remark that “the defendant will tell you” violated privilege against self-incrimination by inviting adverse inference from silence	Simpson: statement improperly suggested he would testify or that his silence could be taken against him, requiring mistrial/curative instruction	State: remark summarized evidence (confession already recorded); not an invitation to infer from silence and was harmless	Court: no Fifth Amendment/Article 22 violation — remark was an inartful summary of expected evidence, defense promptly rebutted in opening, and jury instructions cured any risk; denial of mistrial affirmed
Whether testimony interpreting a detection canine’s alerts required expert designation/disclosure under Md. Rules (5‑702, 4‑263)	Simpson: handler’s testimony reflected specialized training/experience and thus was expert testimony; lack of expert notice violated discovery rules and should have barred the opinion	State: handler’s description was lay/perceptual observation, not expert opinion; alternatively, any error was harmless	Court: admission of handler’s alert testimony without expert qualification was error (canine-handler alert testimony is expert in nature) but error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given confession, video ID, chemical testing, and other corroboration; conviction affirmed

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prosecutorial comment on defendant’s silence violates Fifth Amendment)
Smith v. State, 367 Md. 348 (2001) (Maryland precedent on comment on failure to testify and testing whether remarks invite adverse inference)
Marshall v. State, 415 Md. 248 (2010) (prosecutor’s direct references to defendant’s silence can require reversal when they invite adverse inference)
Ragland v. State, 385 Md. 706 (2005) (opinion that testimony based on specialized training/experience cannot be admitted as lay opinion to evade expert disclosure rules)
Blackwell v. State, 408 Md. 677 (2009) (observational testimony based on specialized training—e.g., HGN test—constitutes expert testimony under Md. Rule 5-702)
State v. Pierce, 231 Neb. 966, 439 N.W.2d 435 (1989) (prosecutor’s opening that a defendant “will testify” improperly pressures defendant and invites adverse inference)
Pérez v. United States, 968 A.2d 39 (D.C. 2009) (opening‑statement remarks close to comments on silence may be mitigated by context and jury instructions)
United States v. Pawlowski, 682 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2012) (isolated opening remark that defendant ‘will present evidence’ not plain error where court instructed jury and defense rebutted in opening)