Simpson v. State
447 S.W.3d 264
Tex. Crim. App.2014Background
- Appellant William Pineda (defendant) was arrested and tried for DWI after a traffic collision; officers observed signs of intoxication and field tests indicated impairment.
- During voir dire, defense counsel objected to a Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) plaque displayed behind the judge’s bench and moved for its removal; the judge refused and denied recusal.
- A separate judge recommended removal but Judge Harmon left the plaque in place; the plaque remained visible to the jury during trial.
- The jury convicted the defendant; sentence was one year community supervision and a $500 fine.
- On appeal the court of appeals treated any error as harmless; a dissent concluded the trial was unfair. The present concurrence agrees the display was error but finds no actual or inherent prejudice warranting reversal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the judge’s display of a MADD plaque is inherently prejudicial | The plaque impermissibly signals judicial alignment with a victim‑advocacy group, undermining presumption of innocence | The plaque was not inherently prejudicial because it was small, partly obscured, and judge instructed neutrality | Not inherently prejudicial here; display was error but harmless — no actual prejudice shown |
| Whether the display caused actual prejudice to jury verdict | Plaintiff: jurors could be influenced; display in judge’s domain likely to be seen as the judge’s view | Defendant: no juror said the plaque affected impartiality; voir dire showed jurors could be fair | No actual prejudice: no juror articulated a consciousness of prejudice; no reasonable probability of different outcome |
| Proper test for courtroom displays that may bias jurors | Plaintiff: apply inherent‑prejudice test when government‑sponsored (judge) conduct is involved | Defendant: even if error, use case‑by‑case actual prejudice inquiry when not inherently prejudicial | Adopted framework: ask first whether practice is inherently prejudicial; if not, require showing of actual prejudice |
| Remedies or procedures after suspected judicial partiality from courtroom décor | Plaintiff: judge should remove partisan plaques and recuse if bias perceived | Defendant: motion to recuse denied; plaintiff can pursue juror inquiries via Rule 606(b) or motion for new trial | Court condemns partisan displays; but absent juror testimony of influence, reversal not required; factual inquiry available post‑trial via juror testimony/rule 606(b) |
Key Cases Cited
- Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (defendant compelled to wear prison clothing at trial violates due process because it undermines presumption of innocence)
- Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986) (presence of uniformed officers in gallery not necessarily inherently prejudicial; jurors may draw neutral inferences)
- Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006) (distinguishes government‑sponsored courtroom practices from private spectator conduct for inherent‑prejudice analysis)
- Hathorne v. State, 459 S.W.2d 826 (Tex.Crim.App. 1970) (early Texas articulation of guarding the presumption of innocence and the trial judge’s influence on jurors)