Simpson v. McDonald
3:15-cv-01859
D. Conn.Feb 15, 2018Background
- The VA Hospital in West Haven operated an opioid treatment program dispensing daily methadone with nurse screening for instability before dosing; urinalysis results are sent out and used for future treatment, not same-day dispensing decisions.
- Frank Defurio was a longstanding daily methadone patient; on Sept. 9, 2013 he met with clinician George Whetstine at 8:00 a.m., provided a urine sample, and received 100 mg methadone at 8:44 a.m.; that morning’s urinalysis later returned negative for methadone but the cause was unexplained; later same day he tested positive.
- At ~12:07 p.m. Defurio struck and fatally injured pedestrian William Simpson on VA property; police observed Defurio as anxious, confused, and possibly delusional; breath test showed no alcohol; two post‑accident urinalyses were positive for methadone.
- Plaintiff Jean Simpson sued the United States under premises liability, alleging VA knew or should have known Defurio was dangerous when permitted to leave after dosing and that this caused Simpson’s death.
- Plaintiff’s expert Dr. Mark Levin (oncologist, not an addiction or psychiatry specialist) opined VA should not have dosed or should have admitted Defurio, but he relied on police reports and post‑accident notes, did not review contemporaneous records from 8:44 a.m., and offered no methodology linking Defurio’s afternoon condition to his morning condition.
- The Court concluded plaintiff offered no admissible evidence showing Defurio was impaired at the time VA treated him, or that VA knew or should have known of such impairment or that VA’s conduct proximately caused the death; granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment and found motion to exclude Dr. Levin moot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether VA had notice Defurio posed a danger when dosed/allowed to leave | Defurio exhibited the same impaired symptoms in the morning as seen after the crash, so VA knew or should have known he was dangerous | No record evidence showed impairment at 8:00–8:44 a.m.; nurses screened and would not dose visibly unstable patients; VA acted consistent with its procedures | No genuine dispute that VA had notice; plaintiff failed to show defect or notice—summary judgment for defendant |
| Whether VA’s conduct was actual and proximate cause of Simpson’s death | Dosing and releasing Defurio led to the collision and death | Plaintiff produced no evidence connecting VA’s conduct to the collision; expert conceded other causes likely | Plaintiff failed to prove causation—summary judgment for defendant |
| Admissibility/usefulness of plaintiff’s expert (Dr. Levin) | Levin opined VA breached duty to admit/stop dosing Defurio | Levin lacked relevant specialty, did not review contemporaneous records, and offered unsupported speculation | Court discounted Levin’s opinion as unhelpful; exclusion motion rendered moot by summary judgment |
| Request to reopen discovery to depose passenger (Slater) | Plaintiff sought deposition to show Defurio’s condition/time of clinic visit | Court had previously extended discovery; additional testimony wouldn’t create a link between morning condition and afternoon episode | Denied as additional discovery would not create a genuine issue of fact |
Key Cases Cited
- Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98 (2d Cir.) (summary judgment standard; resolve inferences for nonmovant)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S.) (party opposing summary judgment must present more than conjecture)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (U.S.) (expert opinions must be based on reliable methodology and be helpful)
- DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, 306 Conn. 107 (Conn.) (premises owner duty to keep premises reasonably safe; notice element)
- Dimmock v. Lawrence & Memorial Hosp., 286 Conn. 789 (Conn.) (standards for premises liability and notice)
- Paige v. St. Andrew’s Roman Catholic Church Corp., 250 Conn. 14 (Conn.) (actual and proximate cause tests in negligence)
- Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159 (2d Cir.) (mere speculation insufficient to defeat summary judgment)
- Sartor v. Arkansas Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620 (U.S.) (summary judgment/directed verdict principles)