Simon Pirela v. Comm of PA Dept of Corr, 710 F. App'x 66

Background

In 1983 Simon Pirela was tried in Pennsylvania for the murder of Pablo Ortiz; he waived a jury for the guilt phase, was convicted in a bench trial, and later sentenced to death by the trial judge. He was ultimately resentenced to life under Atkins after later proceedings established intellectual disability.
At a pretrial suppression hearing the trial judge said on the record, “He’s not subject to the death penalty as long as he has me for a Judge.” Defense counsel and an interpreter conveyed that comment to Pirela.
Pirela signed written and oral waivers of jury at the guilt phase (and later again at the penalty phase). The colloquies addressed jury rights, unanimity, and voluntariness; Pirela answered on the record that no one promised him anything and that he waived voluntarily.
Pirela later filed state post-conviction (PCRA) petitions and federal habeas petitions; a Pennsylvania court vacated his death sentences under Atkins and imposed life terms. Federal habeas review focused on two certified issues: (1) whether Pirela involuntarily waived his guilt-phase jury because of the judge’s alleged promise; and (2) whether counsel was ineffective in advising waiver based on that promise.
The District Court denied relief; the Third Circuit majority affirmed, holding the state-court findings were fairly supported by the record and that the intellectually‑disabled-waiver claim was procedurally defaulted. A concurrence/dissent would have granted an evidentiary hearing.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Pirela’s guilt‑phase jury waiver was induced by the judge’s on‑the‑record comment that he "’s not subject to the death penalty as long as he has me for a Judge"	Pirela: the judge’s statement was a promise; he relied on it (via counsel/interpreter) and waived the jury because he believed he would not get death if tried by that judge	Commonwealth/state courts: the comment was contextual (about sentencing if evidence developed as defense predicted), Pirela had decided to waive before the comment, and the waiver colloquy shows voluntariness	Affirmed: state courts’ finding that the comment did not induce the guilt‑phase waiver is fairly supported by the record; no relief.
Whether Pirela’s intellectual disability rendered his guilt‑phase waiver unknowing/involuntary (separate basis)	Pirela: his low intellect, illiteracy, language barrier, and subnormal IQ made him incapable of a knowing waiver; these factors made him susceptible to the judge’s comment	State: claim was not fairly presented on direct appeal—Pirela’s first PCRA treated mental deficits in support of other claims but did not present an independent legal theory that the waiver was due to intellectual disability	Held: Procedural default — the intellectual‑disability waiver claim was not properly exhausted/fairly presented and is defaulted; District and Third Circuit affirm denial on this ground.
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for advising waiver based on counsel’s understanding of the judge’s remark	Pirela: counsel mischaracterized the judge’s remark as a promise, which led to an invalid waiver; prejudice follows because strategy/preparation would differ	State/Commonwealth: no reasonable probability of a different guilt outcome even if counsel had advised differently; second‑degree conviction would carry life (same as current sentence); and the record shows Pirela knowingly waived	Held: No Strickland relief — Pirela cannot show prejudice or a reasonable probability of a different result; claim denied.
Whether the waiver issue constitutes structural error excusing the need to show Strickland prejudice	Pirela: denial of a jury trial is structural; McGurk-like authority suggests automatic reversal when defendant uninformed	State: here the record shows Pirela was informed, understood, and voluntarily waived; counsel’s mistake (if any) did not render the trial fundamentally unfair	Held: Not structural error in this case; no automatic reversal.

Key Cases Cited

Gardner v. Grandolsky, 585 F.3d 786 (3d Cir. 2009) (standard of review: plenary on legal questions, clear error on facts)
Szuchon v. Lehman, 273 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2001) (habeas review and presumption of state‑court factual correctness)
Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981) (circumstances that overcome state‑court factual findings in habeas)
Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983) (state factual findings entitled to deference unless not fairly supported)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (ineffective assistance two‑prong test: performance and prejudice)
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (circumstances requiring federal evidentiary hearing in habeas)
Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1991) (pre‑AEDPA standard for requesting evidentiary hearing in habeas)
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (execution of intellectually disabled persons unconstitutional)
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977) (on‑the‑record waiver colloquies create a formidable barrier on habeas but not insurmountable)
McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470 (8th Cir. 1998) (example holding that denial of jury where defendant uninformed can be structural error)