Simcha Shoval v. Valet Parking Systems, 73757-1

On September 28, 2012, Simcha Shoval fell exiting a Valet Parking Systems shuttle van after a temple service and was seriously injured; she sued for negligence alleging failure to warn, assist, or drop her in a well-lit area.
Case originally assigned to Judge Mary Yu, later transferred to Judge Samuel Chung.
On January 20, 2015 the parties jointly filed a stipulated order to continue the trial date; Judge Chung signed and set new trial dates.
On March 12, 2015 Shoval filed an affidavit of prejudice seeking a change of judge; Judge Chung denied the motion and proceeded to preside over the trial.
The jury found Valet not negligent; the trial court entered judgment for Valet and earlier had imposed $1,000 sanctions for an expert disclosure violation.
On appeal, Shoval argued the affidavit of prejudice was timely because no discretionary ruling had been made before she filed it; the Court of Appeals reversed, finding the stipulation acceptance was not a discretionary act and therefore the affidavit was timely, vacated the sanctions order, and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Shoval's affidavit of prejudice was timely under RCW 4.12.050(1)	The affidavit was filed before Judge Chung made any discretionary ruling; therefore Shoval was entitled to a change of judge.	The judge exercised discretion by accepting the parties' stipulation to continue the trial date, so the affidavit was untimely.	Acceptance of a parties' stipulation to continue trial is not a discretionary act under RCW 4.12.050(1); the affidavit was timely and the judge erred by not recusing.
Whether sanctions entered by Judge Chung should remain	N/A — relief follows from established recusal error; without Judge Chung the sanctions order would not have been entered.	The sanctions were properly imposed for late expert disclosure.	The sanctions order is vacated because, absent the recusal error, Judge Chung would not have ruled on the matter.

State v. Parra, 122 Wn.2d 590 (1993) (interprets timeliness rule for affidavits of prejudice and distinguishes discretionary rulings from non-discretionary ministerial acts)
State ex rel. Floe v. Studebaker, 17 Wn.2d 8 (1943) (parties' stipulation resolving pretrial matters means court acceptance is not discretionary)
In re Marriage of Tve, 121 Wn. App. 817 (2004) (computer-generated scheduling orders not discretionary rulings)
Hanno v. Neptune Orient Lines, Ltd., 67 Wn. App. 681 (1992) (filling in standard scheduling form is not a discretionary ruling)
In re Marriage of Henneman, 69 Wn. App. 345 (1993) (same principle for form scheduling orders)
In re Recall of Lindguist, 172 Wn.2d 120 (2011) (granting or denying a continuance is a discretionary ruling)
State v. Lile, 193 Wn. App. 179 (2016) (acceptance of parties' agreement to continue trial akin to a stipulation and not a discretionary act)