435 P.3d 1106
Idaho2019Background
- SilverWing purchased 18.1 acres adjacent to Sandpoint Airport to build a 45‑unit hangar/residence PUD and had a perpetual mid‑field taxiway easement.
- County agents (Airport Manager, Airport Board, County engineer, and a County commissioner) provided SilverWing ALP 2(B) and assurances that the taxiway location thereon was correct and conformed with FAA requirements; SilverWing relied on those representations in siting and constructing a taxiway largely on Airport property.
- SilverWing submitted FAA forms through the County; FAA initially approved construction notices but later placed the Airport in noncompliance and informed the County that ALP 2(B) was not FAA‑approved.
- SilverWing built the taxiway (incurring increased costs), executed a Through‑the‑Fence Agreement (TTFA) with the County (which the FAA did not approve), and later faced FAA demands to relocate the taxiway; Congress then changed the law making residential TTFA access permissible.
- SilverWing sued; federal court dismissed most federal claims, remanded the promissory estoppel claim to state court, and after trial a jury awarded SilverWing $250,000 on promissory estoppel.
- The district court denied County's JNOV, awarded SilverWing substantial attorney fees under I.C. § 12‑120(3); the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the JNOV denial, vacated the fee award, and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence supported reliance element/substantial economic detriment for promissory estoppel (JNOV) | SilverWing argued its out‑of‑pocket increased costs from siting/building the taxiway per ALP 2(B) were reliance damages. | County argued there was no substantial evidence of reliance damages because the County's promises were ultimately fulfilled and SilverWing received the approved taxiway position; delay damages were expectancy (precluded). | Reversed denial of JNOV: jury award unsupported as a matter of law because the allowed damages were effectively expectancy/delay or were not reliance losses when promises were ultimately performed. |
| Whether TTFA subsumed promises (bar to promissory estoppel and basis for fees) | SilverWing argued TTFA dealt with access rights and did not cover taxiway location promises; promises were independent. | County argued the TTFA and its no‑oral‑modifications clause encompassed and superseded the promises. | Held TTFA did not cover taxiway‑location promises; promises were independent, so TTFA could not justify fee award. |
| Whether promissory estoppel claim arises from a "commercial transaction" for I.C. § 12‑120(3) attorney fees | SilverWing: relationship and promises were commercial and tied to development/tax revenue, so fees should apply. | County: claim was commercial and fee statute applies. | Held gravamen of promissory estoppel claim was not a "transaction" under § 12‑120(3); fee award under that statute was improper; neither party awarded fees. |
| Whether County is entitled to appellate fees under I.C. § 12‑117 | County sought fees for prevailing on appeal, arguing SilverWing lacked reasonable basis. | SilverWing argued its positions were reasonable. | Held SilverWing's claims and arguments were legally reasonable; County not entitled to fees under § 12‑117. |
Key Cases Cited
- Olson v. EG&G Idaho, Inc., 134 Idaho 778, 9 P.3d 1244 (standard for JNOV/directed verdict)
- Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (treating JNOV as delayed directed verdict; draw inferences for non‑movant)
- Highland Enters., Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 986 P.2d 996 (substantial evidence standard for upholding jury verdict)
- Smith v. Boise Kenworth Sales, Inc., 102 Idaho 63, 625 P.2d 417 (statement of promissory estoppel doctrine)
- Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, L.L.C., 138 Idaho 27, 56 P.3d 1277 (promissory estoppel vs. written contract/consideration)
- Nicholson v. Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Corp., 161 Idaho 877, 392 P.3d 1218 (promissory estoppel as substitute for consideration)
- Stevens v. Eyer, 161 Idaho 407, 387 P.3d 75 (analysis whether claim's gravamen is a commercial transaction for I.C. § 12‑120(3) purposes)