206 A.3d 825
Del.2019Background
- In February 1997 Silverman and Michelle signed a written premarital agreement before marrying in Las Vegas; it waived alimony and left post‑marriage acquisitions as separate property.
- Husband (David) had substantially greater assets and business prospects; he offered to pay for Wife’s counsel and provided a written asset/liability summary the day before signing.
- Wife consulted independent counsel, who advised her not to sign and obtained a signed acknowledgement confirming that advice; Wife signed nonetheless.
- During the marriage Wife stayed home to raise children; in 2015 she sought divorce and asked the Family Court to invalidate the premarital agreement as involuntary, unconscionable, and for insufficient disclosure.
- The Family Court found the agreement voluntary but unconscionable and that Husband’s financial disclosure was inadequate (errors/omissions and timing), and thus refused enforcement. Husband appealed.
- The Supreme Court reviewed de novo whether Husband’s disclosure satisfied the statutory "fair and reasonable disclosure" requirement and whether unconscionability alone could void the agreement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Wife) | Defendant's Argument (Husband) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether unconscionability alone invalidates a premarital agreement | Agreement is so one‑sided (wealth disparity) that it is unconscionable and should be void | Statute requires unconscionability plus inadequate disclosure etc.; unconscionability alone insufficient | Court: Unconscionability alone is insufficient under 13 Del. C. § 326; claimant must also prove inadequate disclosure, non‑waiver, and lack of adequate knowledge |
| Whether Husband provided a "fair and reasonable disclosure" of assets/obligations | Disclosure was untimely, contained material errors/omissions (car title, $3,000 life insurance, misdescribed land interest) and thus inadequate | Discrepancies were immaterial; overall disclosure gave an essentially accurate understanding; Wife had independent counsel and time to review | Court: Disclosure met the statutory standard — errors were immaterial and summary gave an accurate picture; Family Court erred in finding disclosure deficient |
| Whether Wife waived any right to disclosure under the agreement | Wife contends no effective waiver absolved Husband of disclosure duties | Husband argues waiver and/or that Wife had actual knowledge making further disclosure unnecessary | Court did not need to decide waiver because disclosure was sufficient on the record |
| Whether timing/pressure invalidates consent to the agreement | Signing close to wedding and Husband’s restrictions created pressure and inadequate time to evaluate | Wife had independent counsel who advised against signing; wedding was secret (no large guest pressure); timing did not create undue coercion here | Court: Timing did not render disclosure unfair or consent involuntary (voluntariness conceded by parties) |
Key Cases Cited
- Stewart v. Stewart, 41 A.3d 401 (Del. 2012) (standards of appellate review in Family Court matters)
- Hughes v. Peterson, 41 A.3d 395 (Del. 2012) (unconscionability decided as a matter of law)
- duPont v. duPont, 85 A.2d 724 (Del. 1951) (historical discussion of Chancery jurisdiction over premarital/separate maintenance matters)
- Marsocci v. Marsocci, 911 A.2d 690 (R.I. 2006) (holding that unconscionability alone under UPAA does not defeat a premarital agreement)
- Friezo v. Friezo, 914 A.2d 533 (Conn. 2007) (describing "general and approximate" disclosure standard as sufficient under UPAA)