243 A.3d 576
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2020Background
- Plaintiff Enoch Silver requested copies of his medical records from three Maryland hospitals (GBMC, MedStar Union Memorial, Johns Hopkins) and was charged substantial fees (per-page copying and retrieval/preparation fees).
- Silver sued under Maryland Health–General § 4-304(c) (unreasonable medical-records fees) and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, seeking damages and injunctive relief on behalf of putative classes.
- He moved to certify two classes: (1) a damages class of patients who paid for records during a multi-year period; (2) an injunctive-relief class of patients whose requests were processed by the hospitals or their vendor.
- The circuit court assumed Rule 2-231(b) thresholds were met but denied certification under Rule 2-231(c)(3) for the damages class, finding individualized, provider- and time-specific inquiries would overwhelm common issues and that a class action would be unmanageable and not superior.
- The circuit court also denied certification of the injunctive class, reasoning that because the damages class could not be certified and hybrid certification was inappropriate, it would not certify the injunctive class under Rule 2-231(c)(2).
- On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed denial as to the damages class (no abuse of discretion) but vacated and remanded as to the injunctive class because the trial court erred by failing to consider certification under Rule 2-231(c)(2) independently.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the damages class met predominance under Md. Rule 2-231(c)(3) | Reasonableness of fees is provable with common, facility-specific or vendor data; aggregate proof can show classwide liability | Liability and damages vary by hospital, time, requestor, format and applicable law—requiring individualized, request-by-request inquiries | Affirmed: trial court reasonably found individual issues predominated; certification properly denied (no abuse of discretion) |
| Whether class action was superior/manageable (Md. Rule 2-231(c)(3)) | Small individual claims and litigation cost make class the only feasible remedy | Multiple providers, many fee schedules and changing rules make class unmanageable; alternatives and narrower subclasses exist | Affirmed: trial court did not abuse discretion; manageability/superiority concerns valid |
| Whether the court should have created subclasses sua sponte to cure predominance/manageability | Subclasses by provider or fee schedule would allow class adjudication | Subclassing burden rests on plaintiff; many subclasses would still be unmanageable and plaintiff may not adequately represent all subclasses | Affirmed: court not required to sua sponte craft subclasses; plaintiff bears burden to propose them |
| Whether injunctive-relief class should have been certified under Md. Rule 2-231(c)(2) | Injunctive relief appropriate; class-wide policy exists; hybrid certification or (c)(2) alone viable | Primary relief sought is monetary; standing and cohesiveness issues; (c)(2) not appropriate | Vacated/remanded: trial court erred by denying injunctive class solely because damages class failed and hybrid class was not possible; must reconsider (c)(2) certification on correct legal standards |
Key Cases Cited
- Creveling v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 376 Md. 72 (Md. 2003) (standard: de novo review of legal standard; abuse of discretion for ultimate certification decision)
- Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689 (Md. 2000) (discusses Rule 2-231 prerequisites and limits of (c)(2) and (c)(3) analyses)
- Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (U.S. 2011) (classwide injunctive relief requires an indivisible remedy and cohesive class)
- Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (U.S. 1997) (predominance/cohesion principles in class certification)
- Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (U.S. 2016) (when common, generalized proof can be used to resolve liability for a class)
- Ford v. ChartOne, Inc., 908 A.2d 72 (D.C. 2006) (uniform vendor fees can support classwide proof, but single-defendant/vendor facts distinguishability)
- Ruzhinskaya v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 311 F.R.D. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (denial of broad multi-provider class; suggested narrower or provider-level classes)