Silva v. USF Reddaway Inc.
3:17-cv-01354
N.D. Cal.May 15, 2017Background
- Silva worked as a local pickup-and-delivery truck driver for USF Reddaway governed by a collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) that addressed seniority, job assignments, and grievance procedures.
- In 2012 Silva experienced recurrent shoulder pain, requested accommodation (transfer to long-distance line driving to avoid heavy freight handling), and went on leave but was not reassigned to line driving by August 2012.
- Silva sued in California state court (First Amended Complaint) alleging: breach of the CBA, common-law disability discrimination, and FEHA disability discrimination; he conceded the CBA-breach claim is preempted.
- Reddaway removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss the remaining discrimination claims as preempted by § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA).
- The court considered the CBA (filed by defendant, undisputed authenticity) and concluded Silva’s discrimination claims required substantive interpretation of the CBA terms (assignment and seniority), triggering § 301 preemption.
- The court dismissed Silva’s state-law discrimination claims without prejudice to any claim under the CBA or LMRA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Silva’s state-law disability/discrimination claims are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA | Silva contends his discrimination and accommodation claims arise under state law (including FEHA) and do not require interpretation of the CBA | Reddaway argues resolution of the claims will require interpretation of CBA provisions on assignment and seniority, so § 301 preempts Silva's state-law claims | Court held § 301 preempts the discrimination claims because resolving them requires substantive interpretation of the CBA (not merely reference) |
| Whether ancillary misrepresentation allegations avoid preemption | Silva points to alleged misrepresentations about availability of line-driving positions as independent torts | Reddaway says misrepresentation is ancillary to the discrimination claims and, even as a separate claim, would still require assessing duties under the CBA | Court held the misrepresentation allegations do not avoid § 301 preemption because they are tied to CBA duties |
Key Cases Cited
- Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993 (9th Cir.) (establishes § 301 governs suits alleging breach of a CBA)
- Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (preemptive scope of § 301 and federal governance of labor-contract disputes)
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (state-law claims preempted when inextricably intertwined with CBA terms)
- Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (distinguishes consultation from interpretation of CBA in preemption analysis)
- Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (uniform federal interpretation of CBAs promotes repose in labor disputes)
- Audette v. International Longshore & Warehouse Union, 195 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir.) (discrimination claim preempted where resolution requires assessing CBA transfer/assignment terms)
- Miller v. AT&T Network Sys., 850 F.2d 543 (9th Cir.) (articulates multi-factor test for § 301 preemption)
