Silva v. Napier
2017 Ark. App. 422
| Ark. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Gay Lynn Napier (grandmother) was induced by her grandson Daniel Davis (later convicted of a scam) to lend/advance large sums and to purchase vehicles on credit that Davis sold to Mark Silva. Davis used lies, intimidation, and physical threats to manipulate Napier.
- Davis convinced Napier he was in the military and that the Army would repay training, vehicle, and medical expenses; Napier drained savings and borrowed heavily.
- Silva purchased several vehicles from Davis; communications between Silva and Davis occurred on days vehicles were bought. Silva asserts he paid for cars and got Napier’s consent to use her house as collateral.
- Napier signed a deed conveying her house to Silva under circumstances she described as coerced: darkness, being blocked from reading, and ordered to “just sign it.” Davis corroborated coercion and manipulation; Silva and his wife disputed those facts.
- The circuit court set aside the warranty deed, finding clear and convincing evidence Napier lacked intent to convey title (duress/undue influence) and there was no legally sufficient consideration. Silva appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Napier) | Defendant's Argument (Silva) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the deed should be set aside for lack of intent/duress/undue influence | Deed was procured by Davis’s fraud, intimidation, and control; Napier did not intend to transfer title | Napier knowingly signed a deed as collateral; she willingly provided documents and intended to secure the car transactions | Court affirmed: deed set aside — found clear and convincing evidence Napier lacked intent and was subjected to duress/undue influence |
| Whether the deed should be treated as a mortgage (absolute deed intended as security) | N/A (Napier’s position is deed invalid for lack of intent) | The conveyance was intended as security for debt; deed should be treated as a mortgage because parties intended it to secure vehicle payments | Rejected: court found no evidence Napier had intent even to create security; no clear, convincing proof of indebtedness-then-secured by deed |
| Whether the circuit court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous | Factual findings supported by witness testimony and corroborating evidence (jail calls, letters, behavior) | Points to witness inconsistencies and testimony that could support Silva’s version | Affirmed: appellate court defers to trial court credibility determinations and found no clear error |
Key Cases Cited
- Hearne v. Banks, 376 S.W.3d 444 (Ark. Ct. App. 2009) (standard of review for bench-trial factual findings; deference to trial court credibility determinations)
- Wensel v. Flatte, 764 S.W.2d 627 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989) (an absolute deed may be treated as a mortgage if intended to secure an existing debt; party claiming mortgage bears burden of clear and convincing proof)
- Duvall v. Laws, Swain & Murdoch, P.A., 797 S.W.2d 474 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990) (intent of parties and surrounding circumstances determine whether an absolute deed is a mortgage or conditional sale)
- Newport v. Chandler, 178 S.W.2d 240 (Ark. 1944) (relationship between consideration and property value is a recognized test in distinguishing mortgage from sale)