Silk v. Board of Trustees, Moraine Valley Community College, District No. 524
795 F.3d 698
| 7th Cir. | 2015Background
- William Silk, a long‑time adjunct (part‑time, at‑will) professor at Moraine Valley Community College, had triple‑bypass heart surgery in April 2010 and took medical leave.
- Silk accepted summer 2010 course offers, but because he did not provide a return date and the summer session was imminent, department officials reassigned his summer courses; he submitted a medical release in mid‑May.
- After returning, administrators discovered problems with Silk’s syllabi and classroom performance; formal observations in fall 2010 reported poor attendance, low engagement, and substandard instruction.
- In July 2010 a meeting occurred about Silk’s teaching; Silk says a chair stated he was limited to two fall courses because of physical incapacity (denied by chair). Silk was assigned two fall courses.
- In November 2010 Silk was told no future Liberal Arts courses were available and was placed on a college “do‑not‑hire” list; he later taught in Career Programs but was terminated in February 2011 after additional negative evaluations.
- Silk sued under the ADA and ADEA for disability and age discrimination and for retaliation; the district court granted summary judgment for the College. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded one ADA claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Silk is covered by ADA "regarded as" prong | Silk contends College regarded him as having a disability due to his bypass and treated him accordingly | College argues condition was transitory/minor and thus excluded from "regarded as" coverage | Court: College failed to prove impairment was objectively transitory and minor; Silk qualifies for "regarded as" analysis |
| Summer 2010 reassignment (ADA) | Reassignment was based on perception of disability (regarded as) | Reassignment was due to absence/lack of return date and need to staff summer session; medical release requirement appropriate | Court: Silk cannot show decision‑makers regarded him as disabled when they treated him as absent; summary judgment affirmed |
| Fall 2010 course reduction (ADA) | Reduction to two courses was because decision‑makers perceived Silk as physically unable to handle full load (based on alleged statement at July meeting) | College says reduction was for performance concerns; chair denies making the statement | Court: Genuine dispute exists over whether the statement was made; summary judgment improper on this claim — reversed and remanded |
| Terminations and do‑not‑hire placement (ADA, ADEA, retaliation) | Terminations were motivated by disability/age discrimination and retaliation after EEOC filing | College proffers legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons: poor teaching evaluations and enforcement of do‑not‑hire; no evidence decision‑makers knew of disability or EEOC filing; timing not enough | Court: Plaintiff failed to show but‑for causation or knowledge linking decision‑makers to perceived disability or protected activity; summary judgment affirmed on all termination and ADEA/retaliation claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (plurality) (mixed‑motives framework under Title VII)
- Gross v. FBL Financial Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (ADEA requires but‑for causation)
- Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2010) (applied but‑for standard to ADA pre‑amendment mixed‑motive context)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden‑shifting framework for indirect proof)
- Teruggi v. CIT Grp./Capital Fin., Inc., 709 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013) (direct‑method circumstantial evidence categories)
- Grayson v. City of Chicago, 317 F.3d 745 (7th Cir. 2003) (summary judgment standard)
- Dickerson v. Bd. of Trs. of Comty. Coll. Dist. No. 522, 657 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 2011) (employer’s honest belief about performance as legitimate reason)
- Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2008) (suspicious timing generally insufficient to prove retaliation)
- Burks v. Wisconsin Dept. of Transp., 464 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2006) (timing alone does not establish causation)