544 B.R. 306
Bankr. W.D. Pa.2016Background
- Debtor Lisa J. Yanovich filed Chapter 7 on Aug. 27, 2015 and listed 138 General Braddock Dr. (Braddock Property) as her current primary residence.
- She owned a one-quarter interest in the Braddock Property (claimed value $20,000) and listed 610 E. Pittsburgh McKeesport Blvd. (North Versailles Property) as her former primary residence (value $40,000).
- Debtor claimed a $20,000 homestead exemption in the Braddock Property under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1); Trustee objected, asserting the Braddock Property was not the debtor’s primary residence on the petition date.
- At the meeting of creditors the Trustee asserts Debtor said she was living at North Versailles (her driver’s-license address); Debtor later explained she was confused and produced corroborating evidence (moving boxes, storage receipts) showing she was in the process of relocating to Braddock and intended to reside there.
- Debtor filed a statement of intention to surrender North Versailles and retain Braddock; she moved to avoid a judicial lien on Braddock (which was granted by default).
- The court found the facts undisputed and considered the totality of the circumstances (intent plus steps taken to relocate) sufficient to treat Braddock as “used as a residence.”
Issues
| Issue | Trustee's Argument | Debtor's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Braddock Property was "used as a residence" under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) on the petition date | Braddock was not the debtor’s primary residence because she was physically still at North Versailles and had not yet completed the move | Debtor intended to reside at Braddock, was actively moving belongings, listed Braddock as her address in bankruptcy filings, and took steps to protect the exemption | Court overruled the Trustee’s objection; found totality of circumstances (intent + overt steps to relocate + control of property) establishes "use as a residence" for § 522(d)(1) |
Key Cases Cited
- Carter v. Anderson (In re Carter), 182 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 1999) (claimed exemption is presumptively valid)
- Stoner v. [In re Stoner], 487 B.R. 410 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2013) (discussion of interpretive approaches to “residence” under § 522(d)(1))
- Gandy v. [In re Gandy], 327 B.R. 807 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (physical occupancy requirement view)
- Lusiak v. [In re Lusiak], 247 B.R. 699 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000) (constructive occupancy and intent to return)
- DeMasi v. [In re DeMasi], 227 B.R. 586 (D.R.I. 1998) (totality-of-the-circumstances approach; flexible definition of residence)
- Feliciano v. [In re Feliciano], 487 B.R. 47 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013) (intent must be corroborated; mere floating intent inadequate)
- Buick v. [In re Buick], 237 B.R. 607 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1999) (constructive occupancy/possession doctrine)
- Krebs v. [In re Krebs], 527 F.3d 82 (3d Cir. 2008) (purpose of exemptions to protect debtor’s basic necessities)