Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection Agency
410 U.S. App. D.C. 203
| D.C. Cir. | 2014Background
- EPA issued a November 19, 2012 memorandum advising regional offices that, in light of this court’s vacatur of the 2011 Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (Transport Rule), it would be appropriate in certain circumstances to rely on emissions reductions under the earlier Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) as "permanent and enforceable" for pending actions (e.g., redesignations and some regional haze actions) until a valid replacement rule or further proceedings resolved the legal status.
- CAIR had been vacated but allowed to remain in effect pending a valid replacement; the Transport Rule was promulgated to replace CAIR but was vacated by this court in EME Homer City, which instructed EPA to continue administering CAIR until replaced.
- Petitioners (environmental organizations) challenged the Memorandum as (1) a legislative rule requiring notice-and-comment; and (2) arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the Clean Air Act because it permits reliance on CAIR (allegedly temporary) rather than the Act’s "permanent and enforceable" reductions requirement.
- EPA argued lack of jurisdiction (no Article III standing), and also contended the Memorandum was not final agency action or inconsistent with the CAA or this court’s precedents; EPA further noted uncertainty whether it would continue relying on CAIR after the Supreme Court's later decision.
- The district/circuit record included member declarations from organizatons' members alleging health and aesthetic injuries tied to potential future increased emissions in attainment areas (Chicago, Atlanta) and Class I visibility areas, but those members currently lived in attainment areas or had not visited the specific Class I area implicated by the Memorandum.
- The court found the petition not moot despite the Supreme Court later upholding the Transport Rule, because EPA had not yet decided whether it would cease relying on CAIR for pending SIPs; however, the court dismissed for lack of Article III jurisdiction due to insufficient showing of imminent, concrete injury traceable to the Memorandum.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing (Article III injury-in-fact) | Members face imminent health/ aesthetic injury because the Memorandum allows redesignations and haze approvals based on CAIR, removing the CAA’s guarantee of "permanent and enforceable" reductions. | Petitioners lack concrete, imminent injury; members live in attainment areas or have no connection to the specific Class I area affected; risks are speculative. | No standing: plaintiffs failed to show a concrete, imminent injury fairly traceable to the Memorandum. |
| Mootness after Supreme Court decision | N/A (petitioners acknowledged mootness if EPA stopped relying on CAIR). | EPA argued the Supreme Court decision rendered the memorandum’s factual premise moot. | Not moot: case remains live because EPA had not formally ceased relying on CAIR for pending SIPs, so recurrence was possible. |
| Final agency action / rulemaking requirement | Memorandum is a legislative rule requiring notice-and-comment and is final agency action. | Memorandum is not final action or a binding rule; even if guidance, it is lawful. | Court did not reach merits; jurisdictional defect (standing) disposed of the case. |
| Substance: "permanent and enforceable" requirement | Memorandum unlawfully lets EPA treat CAIR reductions as "permanent and enforceable," contrary to CAA. | EPA's approach consistent with court direction to administer CAIR and with regulatory practice in limited circumstances. | Court did not address merits due to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Key Cases Cited
- North Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1178 (D.C. Cir.) (allowed CAIR to remain in effect pending a valid replacement)
- EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir.) (vacated the Transport Rule and instructed EPA to continue administering CAIR pending replacement)
- EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014) (Supreme Court later reversed the vacatur of the Transport Rule)
- Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013) (mootness requires that wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing requirements)
- Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (associational standing; injury-in-fact and traceability rules)
- Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (speculative chain of possibilities insufficient for standing)
- Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009) (procedural-rights-only standing requires a concrete interest)