Siercke v. Siercke, 476 P.3d 376

March 7, 2016 domestic incident between spouses Analli Salla and Duane Siercke; both called 9-1-1. Deputy Ballman interviewed both, observed Salla distraught and with bleeding earlobes, and listened to an audio recording. He arrested Siercke for felony domestic battery in the presence of a child; prosecutors later charged a misdemeanor and dismissed charges months later.
Salla also told a school counselor that Siercke pulled her hair/earring and there was blood.
Nearly a year later, Siercke sued Salla for slander/defamation (among other claims); after a five-day trial, a jury awarded $25,000 on the defamation claim.
Salla moved for a new trial arguing (1) statements to police are absolutely privileged (or alternatively qualifiedly privileged), and (2) the court erred by instructing the jury on defamation per se because her statements did not allege a felony. The district court denied the motion; Salla appealed.
The Idaho Supreme Court held absolute privilege does not extend to reports to police (adopting the court’s later reasoning in Berian), declined to address qualified privilege because Salla failed to preserve it below, and reversed the defamation-per-se instruction error — remanding for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Siercke)	Defendant's Argument (Salla)	Held
Whether statements to law enforcement are absolutely privileged	Absolute privilege does not apply because judicial proceedings had not begun; reports to police are not covered	Statements to law enforcement are absolutely privileged as part of the initial steps of judicial proceedings	Absolute privilege does not extend to reports to police; district court did not err in refusing that instruction
Whether statements to law enforcement enjoy a qualified privilege	If qualified privilege applied, malice could be inferred from circumstances and privilege lost	Alternatively, a qualified privilege protects those reporting suspected crimes to police	Issue not considered on appeal — Salla failed to raise qualified-privilege defense below, so the Court declined to review it
Whether a defamation per se instruction was appropriate	Per se instruction was proper because Salla’s reports led to a felony arrest and thus imputed criminal conduct	Per se instruction improper because her statements, viewed alone, did not plainly and unambiguously impute a felony	Court reversed: per se should not have been decided as a matter of law; whether statements imputed a felony or moral turpitude is for the jury; updated test focuses on the content of the statement (felony or moral turpitude)

Barlow v. Int’l Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 522 P.2d 1102 (discusses qualified privilege and malice in defamation context)
Irish v. Hall, 163 Idaho 603, 416 P.3d 975 (addresses defamation per se and applicable test)
Elliot v. Murdock, 161 Idaho 281, 385 P.3d 459 (elements of a defamation claim)
Clark v. Spokesman-Review, 144 Idaho 427, 163 P.3d 216 (defamation standards cited)
Weeks v. M-P Publ’ns, Inc., 95 Idaho 634, 516 P.2d 193 (when defamatory-per-se is question of law vs fact)
Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., 75 Idaho 502, 275 P.2d 663 (construction of allegedly defamatory language)
Zeyen v. Pocatello/Chubbuck Sch. Dist. No. 25, 165 Idaho 690, 451 P.3d 25 (standard of review for legal questions and jury instructions)
Ackerschott v. Mountain View Hosp., LLC, 166 Idaho 223, 457 P.3d 875 (court’s duty to instruct on reasonable legal theories)