Sidney Lamour Tyson v. State of Indiana, 51 N.E.3d 88

In 2002 Sidney Tyson, then 13, was adjudicated delinquent in Texas for sexual offenses and was required to register as a sex offender in Texas until 2014.
Indiana amended its Sex Offender Registry Act in 2006 to define a “sex or violent offender” to include a person required to register as a sex offender in any jurisdiction.
Tyson moved to Indiana in 2009 and did not register in Indiana; a 2012 traffic stop revealed he was registered in Texas but not in Indiana.
The State charged Tyson with Class D felony failure to register under Indiana law; Tyson moved to dismiss claiming (1) he does not fall within the Indiana statutory definition and (2) applying the amended definition to him violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.
The trial court denied the motion; the Court of Appeals affirmed; the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and reviewed statutory interpretation and the as-applied ex post facto challenge de novo.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Tyson falls within Indiana Code § 11-8-8-5(b)’s definition of “sex or violent offender”	State: (b)(1) independently includes persons required to register in any jurisdiction, so Tyson is included.	Tyson: (b) must be read conjunctively so (b)(1) and (b)(2) together require a child ≥14 adjudicated delinquent, excluding him.	Tyson is included under (b)(1); the subsections provide two independent bases.
Whether applying the 2006 amendment to require Tyson to register in Indiana violates the Ex Post Facto Clause (as‑applied)	State: The amendment is regulatory, not punitive; Tyson already had registration obligations in Texas, so no retroactive punishment.	Tyson: Inclusion after his offense retroactively imposes punishment in violation of Indiana’s Ex Post Facto Clause.	No ex post facto violation as applied: the statute is regulatory in effect and the obligation merely maintained his preexisting registration across state lines.

Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009) (found certain registry effects punitive under Indiana Constitution in a different factual posture)
Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384 (Ind. 2009) (upheld amended registry requirement as nonpunitive where offender already had registration duty)
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (held Alaska’s sex-offender registry regulatory under the Federal Ex Post Facto Clause)
Lemmon v. Harris, 949 N.E.2d 803 (Ind. 2011) (applied the intent-effects test; upheld enhanced registry requirements where prior registration existed)
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981) (ex post facto principle that laws cannot retroactively increase punishment)
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (Mendoza‑Martinez factors for determining whether a statute is punitive)