670 B.R. 567
Bankr. E.D. Cal.2025Background
- Plaintiff and Defendant were each 50% shareholders in a business and entered into a Shareholder Buyout Agreement, requiring Defendant to pay Plaintiff $275,000 ($137,500 cash and $137,500 secured by a note and deed of trust (DOT)).
- The agreement specified the DOT was to be held and recorded after the cash payment, contingent on refinancing Defendant’s home, but the recording was delayed for a year, during which another DOT was recorded, undermining Plaintiff’s security.
- Plaintiff brought a nondischargeability adversary proceeding in bankruptcy after initiating foreclosure, alleging fraud (§ 523(a)(2)) and willful/malicious conduct (§ 523(a)(6)) related to the delay and subordination of his security interest.
- Defendant prevailed in the nondischargeability action and sought attorney’s fees based on contractual attorney’s fee provisions and California Civil Code § 1717.
- The court had to determine whether the action was “on a contract” for purposes of awarding fees under § 1717 despite Plaintiff’s attempt to frame claims in tort (fraud/willful misconduct).
- Defendant sought $20,571.90, but the court reduced the award by services it deemed non-compensable, granting $19,514.40 in fees and expenses.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of § 1717 fees in bankruptcy | Fees unavailable because action pled only fraud and willful/malicious conduct, not contract claims | Fees available because the claims necessarily involve the contract; the action was "on a contract" | Fees available; Plaintiff cannot avoid fee liability by artful pleading |
| Action qualifies as "on a contract" under § 1717 | Only tort theories were pled, so not "on a contract" | Action turns on interpretation/enforcement of Buyout Agreement, Note, and DOT | Complaint's substance involved contract enforcement; "on a contract" satisfied |
| Existence and effect of contractual attorney’s fee clause | Fee clauses restricted to collection actions, not current litigation | Fee clauses apply reciprocally to contract-based actions per § 1717 | Fee clause language and statute cover this litigation |
| Prevailing party status for fee award | Plaintiff, as creditor, not Defendant, should be favored | Defendant prevailed in dischargeability litigation | Defendant is prevailing party under § 1717 |
Key Cases Cited
- Santisas v. Goodin, 17 Cal. 4th 599 (Cal. 1998) (California Supreme Court on scope of reciprocal fee statutes and "action on a contract")
- Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, 25 Cal. 3d 124 (Cal. 1979) (purpose and public policy of Cal. Civ. Code § 1717)
- Heritage Ford v. Baroff, 105 F.3d 439 (9th Cir. 1997) (application of § 1717 in bankruptcy context)
- Merced Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Sparkman, 703 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1983) (state fee statutes operate in bankruptcy)
- Penrod v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Penrod), 802 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2015) (post-Travelers, § 1717 applies to contract issues in bankruptcy)
- Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443 (2007) (state law governs validity of contractual fee claims in bankruptcy)
