Shurigar v. Nebraska State Patrol, 293 Neb. 606

Heath A. Shurigar applied for a Nebraska concealed handgun permit and disclosed a prior Oklahoma conviction for "Transporting Loaded Firearm in Motor Vehicle, Misdemeanor."
Nebraska State Patrol denied the application under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 69-2433(8), which disqualifies applicants convicted within 10 years of laws relating to firearms or similar laws of another jurisdiction.
At the administrative hearing, Oklahoma court documents, the Oklahoma statute, and Shurigar’s admission of the conviction were admitted into evidence.
The Patrol concluded Oklahoma’s statute prohibiting transporting a loaded pistol, rifle, or shotgun in a motor vehicle was "similar" to Nebraska’s § 37-522, which prohibits transporting a loaded shotgun in or on a vehicle on a highway.
The district court affirmed the Patrol’s denial; Shurigar appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court challenging the similarity determination and arguing the court failed to consider legislative intent.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Oklahoma conviction is a "similar law" to Neb. § 37-522 under § 69-2433(8)	Oklahoma statute is not sufficiently similar to § 37-522, so conviction should not disqualify Shurigar	Oklahoma statute and § 37-522 both prohibit transporting loaded firearms on highways and thus are similar	The statutes share characteristics in common; Oklahoma statute is "similar" to § 37-522 and disqualifies applicant
Whether the court failed to consider legislative intent of § 69-2433	Legislature’s purpose focuses on crimes of violence; transporting a loaded pistol is not a crime of violence and should not disqualify	§ 69-2433 disqualifies for firearm-related offenses generally, not only crimes of violence; violation shows unwillingness to follow law and indicates risk	Court and district court properly considered legislative intent; statute targets past firearm-related offenses as indicators of future risk

Underwood v. Nebraska State Patrol, 287 Neb. 204, 842 N.W.2d 57 (statutory interpretation and standard of review under the Administrative Procedure Act)
State v. Au, 285 Neb. 797, 829 N.W.2d 695 (ordinary-meaning principle in statutory construction)
State v. Parks, 282 Neb. 454, 803 N.W.2d 761 (statutory construction principles)
State v. Mena-Rivera, 280 Neb. 948, 791 N.W.2d 613 (legislative intent governs statutory interpretation)