850 F. Supp. 2d 490
M.D. Penn.2012Background
- Plaintiffs own two parcels (Soybean Fields) in Wyoming County, PA, with a railroad bed bisecting the property owned by Defendant Reading Blue Mountain and Northern Railroad Co.
- Plaintiffs allege a 1911 deed conveyed the rail line, and Defendant is its successor-in-interest, owning the lands supporting the tracks.
- A restrictive covenant in the railroad deed purportedly prevents removals or acts contrary to law by future railroad owners.
- There was a canal crossing and a Black Diamond Beach Road crossing originally providing access; the Black Diamond crossing was removed in July 2011, allegedly landlocking Plaintiffs’ southerly parcel.
- Plaintiffs filed in state court seeking ejectment of Defendant from the tracks and a mandatory injunction to reconstruct crossings; Defendant removed to federal court arguing preemption under ICCTA, FRSA, and RSIA.
- The court remands the case to state court and denies attorneys’ fees and costs.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does removal fall under complete preemption related to ICCTA (federal question). | Shupps contend removal is proper due to complete preemption of their state-law claims by ICCTA. | Defendant argues ICCTA preempts state law, enabling removal. | Remand; no complete preemption; removal improper on this basis. |
| Is there jurisdiction under complete preemption analysis for ICCTA/RSIA/FRSA. | Plaintiff maintains complete preemption exists. | Defendant asserts complete preemption applies via ICCTA/RSIA/FRSA. | No blanket complete preemption; analysis must be case-specific and not support removal. |
| Is an as-applied preemption analysis applicable to determine removal jurisdiction. | As-applied approach should assess preemption for ordinary preemption, not complete preemption. | As-applied analysis supports complete preemption in this matter. | As-applied analysis does not establish complete preemption; case should be remanded. |
Key Cases Cited
- Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (Supreme Court 1987) (strictly construed removal; artful pleading cannot create federal question)
- Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Construction Laborers, 463 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court 1983) (federal question arises when a federal question is necessary to state claim)
- Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 858 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1988) (preemption defense is not basis for removal)
- Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995) (preemption analysis; distinction ordinary vs complete preemption)
- Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court 2003) (exclusive federal remedy not required for removal; focus on intent of preemption)
- Joyce v. RJR Nabisco Holdings Corp., 126 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 1997) (complete preemption requires area to be wholly governed by federal law)
- New York Susquehanna and Western Railway Corp., 500 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2007) (ICCTA preemption not absolute; state laws may have remote effects allowed)
- Hi Tech Trans, LLC v. New Jersey, 382 F.3d 295 (3d Cir. 2004) (ICCTA preemption scope; STB jurisdiction limit)
- Elam v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., 635 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (as-applied analysis to complete preemption under ICCTA)
- Fayard v. Northeast Vehicle Serv., LLC, 533 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008) (recognizes ICCTA may sometimes support complete preemption)
- Barrois v. New Orleans & Gulf Coast Railway Co., 533 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 2008) (STB preemption test; complete preemption not universally applicable)