434 P.3d 422
Or.2019Background
- Shriners obtained a default judgment against defendant (Mack Woods) on a promissory-note claim after allegedly defective service.
- Defendant later sued his former attorneys for malpractice, using the default judgment as the measure of damages he claimed he sustained from the attorneys' failures.
- Defendant subsequently moved to set aside the default judgment on the ground that service was defective and the judgment therefore void.
- Defendant’s counsel (Renshaw) had told Shriners’ counsel he could not set aside the default judgment; defendant also relied on the judgment in the malpractice trial verdict.
- The trial court found defendant had manifested assent to the judgment; the issue on appeal was whether judicial estoppel or related doctrines bar setting aside a judgment invalid due to defective service.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a party can be judicially estopped from setting aside a judgment invalid due to defective service | Shriners: judicial estoppel/estoppel prevents Woods from attacking the judgment because he accepted its benefits and manifested assent | Woods: default judgment is void for defective service and cannot be enforced; he may challenge it despite prior conduct | Held: A party may be estopped from setting aside a judgment invalid for defective service when the party manifested intent to treat it as valid and others relied on it |
| Whether counsel’s statements can bind defendant | Shriners: Renshaw’s admissions to Shriners’ counsel bound defendant as agent | Woods: disputes that counsel’s statements should preclude relief | Held: Renshaw, as defendant’s agent, reasonably bound defendant; his statements manifested assent |
| Whether using the judgment to quantify damages constitutes assent | Shriners: relying on the judgment in a malpractice suit amounted to accepting it as valid | Woods: using the amount for damages does not concede enforceability | Held: Using the judgment to prove damages is an affirmative manifestation of treating the judgment as valid |
| Whether relief would unfairly impair others’ reliance interests | Shriners: vacating would harm parties (trial court, jury, insurer) who relied on the judgment | Woods: relief is proper because service was defective | Held: Vacatur would impair substantial reliance interests; judicial estoppel applies |
Key Cases Cited
- Garner v. Garner, 182 Or. 549 (1948) (a judgment entered without subject matter jurisdiction is void; parties cannot consent to subject matter jurisdiction)
- Carey v. Lincoln Loan Co., 342 Or. 530 (2007) (judicial estoppel generally does not bar challenging subject matter jurisdiction)
- Decker v. Wiman, 288 Or. 687 (1980) (defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction or improper service are waived if not timely raised)
- Hampton Tree Farms, Inc. v. Jewett, 320 Or. 599 (1995) (judicial estoppel protects the judiciary and bars inconsistent positions that unfairly manipulate judicial machinery)
- Price v. Price, 169 N.C.App. 187 (2005) (party estopped from challenging a prior judgment due to insufficient service after manifesting assent and obtaining benefit)