Shouse v. Commonwealth
2015 Ky. LEXIS 1852
| Ky. | 2015Background
- Mollie T. Shouse left her 2-year-old son strapped in a car overnight; the child was found dead the next afternoon. Shouse had taken Xanax earlier that day and had been with a friend; drugs were found in her apartment. She was charged with wanton murder, second-degree criminal abuse, first-degree wanton endangerment, and possession of a controlled substance.
- At trial the jury was instructed on wanton murder (KRS 507.020(b)) with second-degree manslaughter listed as a lesser included offense; it convicted Shouse of wanton murder, criminal abuse, wanton endangerment, and possession. Court imposed a total 35-year sentence.
- Shouse appealed. The central statutory issue involved a 2000 amendment to the second-degree manslaughter statute, KRS 507.040(1)(b), which specifically criminalizes causing the death of a child under eight by leaving the child in a motor vehicle under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to life that create a grave risk of death.
- The manslaughter amendment uses the aggravated-wantonness mental state (same mental state described for wanton murder), creating a potential overlap/conflict with the wanton murder statute.
- The Supreme Court of Kentucky vacated the wanton murder conviction and reversed the first-degree wanton endangerment conviction, affirmed the second-degree criminal abuse conviction, and remanded for possible retrial on the homicide charge capped at second-degree manslaughter.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether KRS 507.040(1)(b) precludes wanton murder when a child under 8 dies after being left in a vehicle | Shouse: the 2000 amendment makes this fact pattern second-degree manslaughter only; it preempts a murder conviction | Commonwealth: evidence of aggravated wantonness supports wanton murder; manslaughter is a lesser option | Court: KRS 507.040(1)(b) is a specific statutory carve‑out; when its elements are met the highest allowable homicide charge is second‑degree manslaughter — wanton murder conviction vacated |
| Whether jury instruction and conviction for first‑degree wanton endangerment were supported by evidence of driving while impaired and other facts | Shouse: evidence was insufficient to show aggravated wantonness or a substantial danger of death/serious injury during the driving episode | Commonwealth: driving while on drugs, on a spare tire, and for extended time supported wanton endangerment | Court: evidence fell short of Ramsey-level facts; conviction reversed for insufficiency |
| Whether convictions for homicide and second‑degree criminal abuse violate statutory double jeopardy (KRS 505.020(1)(a)) | Shouse: criminal abuse is a lesser included offense and thus barred with homicide | Commonwealth: criminal abuse here included elements (torture/cruel confinement) not subsumed by death | Court: no statutory double jeopardy; abuse did not merge into homicide under these charges; abuse conviction affirmed |
| Evidentiary and trial errors (prior acts, phone records, comments, continuance, cumulative error) | Shouse: various evidentiary and procedural errors warrant reversal | Commonwealth: most objections were not preserved or errors were harmless | Court: prior instances of leaving the child were improperly admitted under KRE 404(b) but harmless; other alleged errors were not reversible or not preserved; no cumulative reversible error |
Key Cases Cited
- Hurt v. Commonwealth, 409 S.W.3d 327 (Ky. 2013) (discusses aggravated wantonness concept)
- Graves v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 858 (Ky. 2000) (uses aggravated wantonness language)
- Light v. City of Louisville, 248 S.W.3d 559 (Ky. 2008) (specific statute controls over general statute in conflicts)
- Commonwealth v. Lundergan, 847 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1993) (applying rule of lenity in criminal statute conflicts)
- White v. Commonwealth, 178 S.W.3d 470 (Ky. 2005) (rule of lenity favors defendant)
- Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 157 S.W.3d 194 (Ky. 2005) (driving while intoxicated with child can in some facts support first‑degree wanton endangerment)