Shouchen Yang v. Loretta E. Lynch, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9307

Background

Petitioner Shouchen Yang, a Chinese national, was ordered removed after an immigration judge (IJ) found his testimony not credible during asylum proceedings.
Yang filed a timely motion to reopen, submitting a new affidavit claiming conversion to Christianity and persecution of his wife in China, plus a purported letter from his wife and other documents.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied the motion, reasoning Yang’s new affidavit was unreliable because the IJ had previously found his testimony not credible and Yang did not explain or overcome that prior adverse credibility finding.
Yang petitioned this court for review, arguing the BIA improperly discredited his new evidence by applying the falsus maxim (falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus) when deciding a motion to reopen.
The Ninth Circuit majority held the BIA abused its discretion by applying the falsus maxim on a motion to reopen because the BIA may not make adverse credibility determinations in that context and must credit new evidence unless it is inherently unbelievable.
A dissenting judge agreed the BIA should not make adverse credibility findings on reopening but concluded the BIA here properly denied the motion under Matter of Coelho for failure of proof, not by an impermissible credibility ruling.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
May the BIA apply the falsus maxim to deny a motion to reopen?	Yang: No — BIA cannot make adverse credibility determinations on motions to reopen; must credit new evidence unless inherently unbelievable.	Government: Yes — extend Enying Li to allow BIA to rely on prior IJ credibility findings and apply falsus maxim to motions to reopen (follow Second Circuit).	No — BIA may not apply falsus maxim on motions to reopen; doing so is contrary to Ninth Circuit law.
Standard for evaluating evidence on motions to reopen	Yang: BIA must accept and credit new evidence unless it is inherently unbelievable.	Government: BIA may discount new evidence based on prior adverse credibility findings.	BIA must credit evidence on reopening unless inherently unbelievable; cannot make new adverse credibility findings.
Whether BIA’s denial here amounted to an impermissible credibility determination	Yang: BIA explicitly required Yang to overcome IJ’s adverse credibility finding, discrediting his affidavit.	Government/BIA (dissent view): BIA denied for failure of proof under Matter of Coelho, not by making an adverse credibility finding.	Majority: BIA discredited Yang’s affidavit based on prior IJ credibility finding — that was an improper credibility determination and an abuse of discretion.
Remedy when BIA improperly discredits evidence on reopening	Yang: Grant petition and remand for proceedings crediting the affidavit.	Government: Affirm denial as appropriate under Coelho.	Grant petition; remand so BIA must assess sufficiency of evidence while crediting the affidavit (unless inherently unbelievable).

Key Cases Cited

Enying Li v. Holder, 738 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2013) (IJ may apply falsus maxim to discredit witness at removal hearing)
Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007) (Second Circuit held BIA may apply falsus maxim to deny motion to reopen)
Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2005) (credibility determinations on motions to reopen are inappropriate)
Tadevosyan v. Holder, 743 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 2014) (evidence on motion to reopen must be credited unless inherently unbelievable)
Yan Rong Zhao v. Holder, 728 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2013) (standard of review: denial of motion to reopen reviewed for abuse of discretion)
Vitug v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2013) (BIA reviews IJ credibility determinations only for clear error)
Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 2005) (appellate bodies lack benefit of observing witness’s demeanor; credibility findings require fact-finder role)
Mejia v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2002) (BIA abuse of discretion occurs when action is contrary to law)