Shoemaker v. State ex rel. Protection of C.L.
2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 4594
| Tex. App. | 2016Background
- Clarissa (pseudonym) sought a protective order under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 7A after repeated interactions with Daniel Shoemaker from 2008–2014, including workplace contacts, a confrontational trail encounter, a possible shove at a café, a public Yelp review, a threatening 2014 email, and an alleged apartment-sighting.
- The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and issued a 10-year protective order prohibiting contact, certain communications, and limiting firearm use, finding reasonable grounds that Clarissa was a stalking victim under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
- Shoemaker appealed, arguing (1) legally and factually insufficient evidence supported the order if only post-2011 conduct were considered, and (2) the stalking statute’s reliance on a complainant’s feelings violates due process.
- The trial court discounted the apartment-sighting because of conflicting testimony but relied on the Yelp review, the 2014 email, and the prior history between the parties to find stalking.
- The court addressed admissibility and relevance of pre-2011 conduct, whether such evidence could be considered in a protective-order hearing, and preservation of constitutional objections.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Clarissa / State) | Defendant's Argument (Shoemaker) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legal & factual sufficiency of evidence for protective order (post‑2011) | Yelp review and 2014 email, viewed with prior history, show repeated electronic communications reasonably likely to harass and caused Clarissa to feel harassed/offended; support reasonable grounds for stalking. | Limiting review to post‑2011 incidents (apartment sighting and email) leaves insufficient evidence to support order. | Affirmed: legally and factually sufficient evidence exists (Yelp + 2014 email + history satisfy stalking elements). |
| Admissibility of pre‑2011 conduct at protective‑order hearing | Pre‑2011 acts are relevant to show context and whether later communications would cause the complainant (and a reasonable person) to feel harassed/offended. | Pre‑2011 acts were not admissible to prove stalking because the harassment/stalking statute was amended later; Article 38.46 applies only to prosecutions and thus cannot admit those acts. | Court: Article 38.46 inapplicable, but trial court did not abuse discretion in admitting pre‑2011 evidence for limited purpose (context and impact on complainant/reasonable person). |
| Due process challenge to stalking statute’s reliance on complainant’s feelings (Penal Code §42.072(a)(3)(D)) | (Raised on appeal) The statute is unconstitutionally vague because one cannot know another’s subjective feelings; thus violates due process. | State argued the claim was waived because not raised in trial court; statute permits objective reasonable-person inquiry. | Waived: Shoemaker failed to present the constitutional challenge in the trial court and inadequately briefed it on appeal; issue not preserved. |
| Use of Family Code standards / duration challenge | (Clarissa/State) Protective order properly brought under Code of Criminal Procedure (art. 7A) which permits longer duration and applies for stalking victims. | Shoemaker argued Family Code limits and that family/dating standards were improperly applied. | Rejected: application and order were under Code of Criminal Procedure; Family Code limitations and standards do not apply; any verbal misstatements by judge do not require reversal when order is supportable on correct legal theory. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. 2000) (standard for reviewing protective‑order findings when trial court is factfinder)
- City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (legal‑sufficiency standard and view of evidence favoring prevailing party)
- Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1996) (factual‑sufficiency standard: set aside only if against the great weight and preponderance)
- McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 1986) (factfinder may believe some witnesses and disbelieve others; resolve conflicts)
- Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1978) (judgment will be affirmed if supported by any legal theory even if trial court misstated law)
- Whirlpool Corp. v. Camacho, 298 S.W.3d 631 (Tex. 2009) (abuse of discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)