Shine v. Mohr
3:17-cv-01140
N.D. OhioDec 27, 2017Background
- Pro se plaintiff Douglas Shine, Jr., an inmate, sues ODRC Director Gary Mohr, ToCI Warden John Coleman, and Corrections Officer Ashley Bentham under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort law for an incident in which Bentham allegedly closed a cell door on Shine’s hand, fracturing knuckles and causing nerve damage.
- Shine alleges the injury occurred after he microwaved food with permission and tried to place his cup in his cell doorway; he requested medical care but was initially denied and later treated at an outside hospital.
- Claims asserted include an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim, state-law assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and retaliation for reporting the incident.
- The complaint names Mohr and Coleman but contains no factual allegations tying them to the incident or to any unconstitutional conduct.
- The court screened the in forma pauperis complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 to determine whether claims were plausible and had an arguable basis.
- Court dismissed Mohr and Coleman for lack of personal involvement and dismissed the retaliation claim for failure to plead facts; allowed to proceed: Eighth Amendment claim and state-law claims (assault and IIED) against Bentham only.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Personal involvement of Mohr and Coleman | Mohr and Coleman are named defendants in the suit | No facts show Mohr or Coleman participated in or knew of the incident | Dismissed Mohr and Coleman for lack of personal involvement; claims against them are dismissed |
| Retaliation claim adequacy | Shine alleges retaliation after reporting the incident | Complaint lacks factual allegations showing retaliation or protected conduct | Retaliation claim dismissed for failure to give fair notice or plausible facts |
| Eighth Amendment / assault against Bentham | Bentham slammed the cell door on Shine’s hand, causing fracture and nerve damage | (Implied defense) force was not alleged to be justified or incidental; no counterfactual pleaded | Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim and state-law assault claim against Bentham survive initial screening and may proceed |
| Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) against Bentham | Bentham’s conduct caused physical injury and emotional distress | (Implied defense) facts must meet tort pleading standard | IIED claim against Bentham survives initial screening and may proceed |
Key Cases Cited
- Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (per curiam) (pro se pleadings are liberally construed)
- Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (pro se complaints held to less stringent standards)
- Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989) (§ 1915 dismissal where claim lacks arguable basis in law or fact)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (legal conclusions and bare assertions insufficient under Rule 8)
- Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (liability requires personal involvement)
- Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2008) (complaint must give fair notice of claims and grounds)